Why Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) Will Help Unmasking the Hidden Chaos in Scientific Progress

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, written by Thomas S. Kuhn, is one of the most influential works in the philosophy of science. Originally published in 1962 by The University of Chicago Press and followed by revised editions in 1970, 1996, and 2012, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions fundamentally changed how we understand scientific development.

Kuhn (1922–1996) was a physicist-turned-historian and philosopher of science. He held a professorship at MIT and authored several key texts in science studies, including The Copernican Revolution and The Essential Tension. His dual background in physics and philosophy gives The Structure of Scientific Revolutions a unique blend of scientific insight and philosophical depth.

This work belongs to the realm of the philosophy of science and intellectual history. It is not a textbook, but a conceptual map of how science really evolves—not through slow, logical accumulation, but through disruptive, chaotic shifts that Kuhn famously labeled as “scientific revolutions.”

Kuhn’s main thesis is revolutionary in itself: science does not progress via a linear accumulation of knowledge, but rather through paradigm shifts—sudden, non-linear changes in the fundamental frameworks by which scientists understand the world. As Kuhn writes in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, “History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed”.

Background

Science Before Kuhn

Before Kuhn, the dominant view was rooted in logical positivism. Science was seen as a continuous, rational, and objective enterprise. Figures like Karl Popper emphasized “falsification” as the hallmark of scientific progress—hypotheses are tested and rejected in favor of better ones.

Enter Kuhn

Kuhn challenged this view by grounding his argument in historical analysis. His insight came from reading outdated scientific texts and realizing how differently people thought in different scientific eras. He noticed that scientists didn’t abandon theories because they were falsified. They clung to them until a better paradigm replaced the old one—often suddenly and painfully.

Kuhn introduced a whole new vocabulary: normal science, paradigm, anomaly, crisis, and revolution. These concepts reshaped how we understand the evolution of science—and the human mindset behind it.

Summary: The Heart of the Book

Chapter I: Introduction – A Role for History

Thomas S. Kuhn opens The Structure of Scientific Revolutions with a statement as daring as it is transformative: “History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed” (p. 1). This first line sets the tone for a radical reevaluation of how we understand scientific progress.

Rather than portraying science as a steady accumulation of facts, Kuhn invites the reader to consider how the historical development of science reveals deep structural changes—what he famously calls “scientific revolutions.”

Kuhn’s main argument in the introduction is that science is not merely a linear march toward truth, but a complex, discontinuous process shaped by the rise and fall of paradigms—shared models of understanding within scientific communities.

These paradigms guide what questions are worth asking, what methods are valid, and what counts as an acceptable answer. “The study of paradigms,” Kuhn writes later, “is what mainly prepares the student for membership in the particular scientific community with which he will later practice” (p. 11). This orientation is, at its core, historical.

Kuhn critiques the “traditional” view of science—a view where science is a cumulative enterprise, progressing rationally and objectively toward truth. This view, he claims, does not align with what history shows us.

In reality, episodes like the Copernican Revolution or the shift from Newtonian physics to Einsteinian relativity suggest dramatic breaks rather than gradual improvements. These breaks are revolutions in scientific thinking, reshaping the intellectual landscape much like political revolutions do in governance.

His purpose, then, is not to write a history of science per se, but to use history as a tool to reshape our philosophical understanding of science. He argues, “Out-of-date theories and conceptions are not in principle wrong. Rather, they are incommensurable with the new frameworks that replace them” (p. 103). The term incommensurability—a central Kuhnian concept—highlights that different scientific paradigms may be so fundamentally different that they are not directly comparable in terms of truth or falsity.

The first chapter is thus a manifesto for a new philosophy of science—one that recognizes the role of historical context, community consensus, and paradigm-bound thinking in shaping the development of scientific knowledge.

Kuhn asks us to accept that revolutions in science may not bring us closer to some ultimate truth, but rather move us away from previously accepted frameworks that no longer solve pressing puzzles. This shift in outlook has made Structure one of the most influential nonfiction books of the 20th century and a staple in lists such as the “100 Best Nonfiction Books of All Time” by the Modern Library and the “100 Most Influential Books Since World War II” by the Times Literary Supplement.

In sum, Kuhn’s introduction dismantles the myth of cumulative objectivity in science, inviting readers to view science as a socially embedded, historically contingent practice, where progress often comes through disruption, not continuity.

Chapter II: The Route to Normal Science

In Chapter II of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, titled “The Route to Normal Science,” Thomas S. Kuhn lays the foundational path that science follows before it achieves what he terms “normal science.” This stage precedes revolutionary science and represents a period of methodological and intellectual consolidation under a unified framework or paradigm.

Kuhn opens this chapter by emphasizing that every scientific field begins with a pre-paradigm period—a time marked by competing schools of thought, conflicting methodologies, and the absence of consensus.

He writes: “In these fields… there are almost always significant disagreements about the definition of the field and its fundamental problems” (p. 15). Unlike mature sciences—such as physics or chemistry—emerging disciplines like psychology or sociology (at the time) lack a cohesive paradigm that dictates which problems are worth solving and how to solve them.

The path to normal science begins when a particular approach proves so fruitful that it gathers a community of adherents. Kuhn refers to this as the initial achievement—a breakthrough work or discovery that becomes exemplary.

These exemplars give birth to what Kuhn calls a “paradigm,” a term he uses to denote a shared model of practice, theory, method, and standards. As he famously puts it, a paradigm must be “sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents… [and] sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve” (p. 10–11).

For instance, Newton’s Principia Mathematica was such an achievement in classical mechanics, as was Lavoisier’s chemical theory in the late 18th century. These paradigms didn’t just present answers—they provided frameworks within which new problems could be meaningfully tackled. According to Kuhn, once a paradigm is adopted, a field shifts from the chaos of foundational disputes into a phase of cumulative, puzzle-solving research. This is the start of “normal science.”

What makes this process so compelling is Kuhn’s claim that scientific consensus is socially constructed within a professional community, rather than discovered through some absolute method. Paradigms don’t just emerge because they’re objectively “true”—they gain traction because they allow a scientific community to move forward. As Kuhn subtly argues, “Paradigm debates are not really about relative problem-solving ability” (p. 110); they’re also about persuasive power, historical context, and community allegiance.

This chapter lays the groundwork for understanding that scientific revolutions are only possible because normal science emerges first. Without the consolidation of thought under a paradigm, there would be no “normal puzzles” to challenge, no anomalies to accumulate, and no crises to spark revolutionary shifts.

In essence, Chapter II of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions shows us how science moves from disorder to order, from pluralism to unity, and how that unity—far from being final—is what makes future revolutions inevitable. This developmental trajectory marks Kuhn’s radical departure from the traditional linear view of scientific progress and remains a key reason why The Structure of Scientific Revolutions continues to appear on lists of the best history and philosophy books ever written.

Chapter III: The Nature of Normal Science

In Chapter III of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, “The Nature of Normal Science,” Thomas S. Kuhn dives deeper into the character of science once a paradigm is firmly established. Having described the route to normal science in Chapter II, Kuhn now shifts focus to what normal science actually entails. He argues that most scientific activity is not revolutionary but rather routine puzzle-solving—work that presupposes the validity of a prevailing paradigm and operates within its boundaries.

Kuhn characterizes normal science as “research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements… that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice” (p. 10).

These foundational achievements provide not only answers but, more crucially, the rules, standards, instruments, and language of the scientific community. As Kuhn phrases it: “Normal science, the activity in which most scientists inevitably spend almost all their time, is predicated on the assumption that the scientific community knows what the world is like” (p. 5).

Kuhn identifies three primary aims of normal science:

1. Fact Gathering – refining existing measurements, extending precision, and classifying previously unnoticed phenomena;
2. Theory Articulation – improving and expanding the mathematical and conceptual structure of a theory;
3. Puzzle-solving – addressing anomalies and inconsistencies within the paradigm framework using established methods.

Puzzle-solving is Kuhn’s central metaphor for normal science. He provocatively suggests that normal science is more about refinement than discovery: “The most striking feature of the normal research problems… is how little they aim to produce major novelties” (p. 35). Scientists, according to Kuhn, behave like skilled artisans working to resolve “puzzles”—technical challenges defined and constrained by the paradigm. Importantly, the very existence of these puzzles assumes that a solution exists and is obtainable using accepted tools.

This view defies the popular conception of scientists as bold discoverers constantly seeking new theories. Instead, Kuhn’s scientist is more like a technician or engineer, engaged in precise and disciplined work. And yet, this apparent “narrowness” is what makes scientific progress possible. The paradigm offers a focused lens, allowing research to flourish through depth rather than breadth.

However, Kuhn is not dismissive. He insists that this structure is necessary and even productive. It allows for cumulative knowledge, shared methodologies, and professional cohesion. As he writes, “Normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when successful, finds none” (p. 52). But it is precisely this success that builds the confidence and technical sophistication necessary for science to advance.

In this way, Chapter III of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions articulates Kuhn’s radical yet grounded thesis: science is most productive when it is least creative. By submitting to paradigmatic constraints, scientific communities can develop robust theories, test methods, and refine understanding. However, this same commitment also blinds them to alternative possibilities—setting the stage for future crises.

This framework, where normal science lays the groundwork for eventual revolution, is part of why Kuhn’s work continues to rank among the most influential nonfiction books of the last century. It reminds us that science is a deeply human endeavor—driven not only by logic and experimentation but by traditions, expectations, and faith in shared tools.

Chapter IV: Normal Science as Puzzle-Solving

In Chapter IV of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn sharpens his metaphor: normal science is puzzle-solving. This chapter provides a closer, almost intimate look at what scientists actually do under a functioning paradigm—and how the work they do resembles that of solving puzzles rather than discovering unknown worlds.

Kuhn writes, “One of the things a scientific community acquires with a paradigm is a criterion for choosing problems that… can be assumed to have solutions” (p. 37). Here, puzzles are not open-ended mysteries. They are problems that, within the framework of the paradigm, are believed to be solvable—and solving them successfully reinforces the paradigm rather than challenges it.

This insight flips the romantic image of science as a chaotic battlefield of competing ideas. In contrast, Kuhn shows us a more sober and methodical practice: scientists work on puzzles with rules, within boundaries, and with the expectation of resolution. He notes, “The man who is striving to solve a problem defined by existing knowledge and technique is not just looking around. He knows what he wants to achieve, and he designs his instruments and directs his thoughts accordingly” (p. 38).

The puzzle metaphor emphasizes several key features of normal science:

• Commitment to the paradigm: Scientists are not trying to reinvent the rules; they are applying them.
• Constraint and creativity: Though bounded by the paradigm, the process still demands ingenuity—just within defined limits.
• Evaluation by success: A puzzle is judged solved when the community agrees the solution fits within the paradigm’s rules.

Importantly, the satisfaction in puzzle-solving comes from overcoming technical difficulty, not from challenging the foundations of the field. Kuhn says, “If the paradigm had been invalidated, puzzle-solving would cease to be a valid scientific activity” (p. 42). The paradigm not only defines the problems but also legitimizes the effort. The scientist, then, is like a skilled chess player operating within the fixed rules of the game.

However, Kuhn also hints at the danger of this mindset. Scientists become so immersed in their puzzles that they may overlook deeper anomalies—early signals that the paradigm itself might be breaking down. This sets the stage for crisis, but during normal science, such anomalies are often ignored or brushed aside as experimental error or noise.

Kuhn’s portrayal of scientists is both respectful and revealing. He does not reduce science to rote mechanics, but he wants readers to understand that scientific advancement often looks like concentrated craftsmanship, not conceptual revolution. This form of discipline is what enables science to accumulate knowledge—but it also limits how easily scientists can imagine alternate frameworks.

Chapter IV subtly prepares us for the next phase in Kuhn’s argument. When puzzle-solving fails repeatedly—when anomalies resist solution—the very tools and assumptions that made normal science productive begin to crack. The rules of the game no longer apply. And that, Kuhn suggests, is where revolutions begin.

This chapter not only deepens our understanding of scientific practice but also explains why The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is considered one of the most important nonfiction works of the 20th century. By reframing science as a tradition-bound yet productive practice, Kuhn challenges readers to rethink how progress really happens.

Chapter V: The Priority of Paradigms

In Chapter V of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, titled “The Priority of Paradigms,” Thomas Kuhn formally introduces one of the most significant and now-ubiquitous concepts in the philosophy of science: the paradigm. While he has already referenced paradigms in earlier chapters, here he explains why they are not merely helpful but foundational to scientific activity—and why all scientific inquiry is structured around them.

Kuhn writes, “No natural history can be interpreted in the absence of at least some implicit body of intertwined theoretical and methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation, and criticism” (p. 44). In other words, science is never a neutral or purely objective collection of data. Scientists always operate within a theoretical framework that tells them what to observe, what questions to ask, and how to interpret the answers. This framework is what Kuhn calls the paradigm.

He argues that before any field becomes a proper science, it goes through a pre-paradigmatic phase marked by debates about fundamentals—what to study, how to study it, and what counts as success. Once a single paradigm wins out (as Newtonian mechanics did in the 17th century), the field stabilizes and enters the “normal science” phase.

Kuhn then explains that paradigms serve multiple roles:

• They define legitimate problems: “Normal science consists in the actualization of that promise… by extending the knowledge of those facts that the paradigm displays as particularly revealing” (p. 24).
• They constrain inquiry: Not every question is valid. Scientists work on problems only deemed relevant by the paradigm.
• They guide instrumentation and methodology: How experiments are built, and how data is interpreted, depends on what the paradigm expects to find.

The paradigm, then, is not just a theory—it is a constellation of assumptions, values, tools, and exemplars. Kuhn later clarifies this point in the Postscript, stating that paradigms are best understood as “exemplars”—concrete problem-solutions used to teach students how to think like a scientist in that field (Postscript, p. 186).

Importantly, Kuhn notes that once a paradigm is established, scientists often treat it with quasi-religious conviction, resisting alternative viewpoints. This loyalty is not irrational but practical: the paradigm enables progress by providing a shared language and vision. Without such cohesion, coordinated scientific work would be impossible.

But here, Kuhn plants the seeds of a future problem. The same faith in a paradigm that makes normal science productive also makes it vulnerable to stagnation. When anomalies accumulate—facts that the paradigm cannot explain—scientists often ignore or reinterpret them rather than risk foundational change. Thus, paradigms not only guide but limit perception, setting the stage for the eventual breakdown Kuhn will describe in later chapters.

In short, Chapter V elevates the paradigm from a useful concept to the organizing principle of scientific life. The idea that science is not just empirical but interpretive—bounded by shared beliefs and methods—was revolutionary, and it has reshaped not just the philosophy of science but our broader understanding of knowledge and progress.

This insight, so elegantly delivered by Kuhn, is precisely why The Structure of Scientific Revolutions remains one of the 100 most important nonfiction books ever written—cited across disciplines and still relevant in our postmodern, post-truth world.

Chapter VI: Anomaly and the Emergence of Scientific Discoveries

In Chapter VI, “Anomaly and the Emergence of Scientific Discoveries,” Thomas Kuhn begins the dramatic pivot from the orderly world of normal science to the beginnings of disruption. The central theme here is anomaly—data or observations that don’t fit the expected outcomes within an established paradigm.

Kuhn defines anomaly as “the recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science” (p. 52). At first glance, an anomaly may appear as mere error—perhaps a misreading, faulty equipment, or an experimental hiccup. But over time, if the anomaly persists and resists explanation, it takes on a heavier weight. This persistent misfit between reality and theory becomes the crack in the paradigm’s armor.

Kuhn notes that many scientific discoveries begin not with the intentional search for the unknown but with an unexpected result—a deviation that scientists cannot easily ignore. “Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations” (p. 52). This is a profound shift: discovery doesn’t originate from seeking novelty, but from defending orthodoxy and failing.

Anomalies don’t always lead to discoveries. Often, they’re tucked away or temporarily explained away. However, when they persist, scientists may begin to scrutinize the instruments, redo the experiments, or eventually question the underlying assumptions. This is the beginning of extraordinary science—science at the edge of the paradigm, testing its limits.

Kuhn offers the example of the discovery of X-rays by Wilhelm Röntgen in 1895. Initially, Röntgen encountered a strange glow in his laboratory—an anomaly. Instead of dismissing it, he pursued it methodically. His openness to exploring what didn’t fit led to one of the most significant discoveries of modern physics. Kuhn writes: “Röntgen’s experience was not one that led him to seek novelty; it was an effort to understand a peculiar result” (p. 58).

Another striking example Kuhn gives is the discovery of oxygen. For a long time, chemists explained combustion via the phlogiston theory. The discovery of oxygen did not just add a new element—it required dismantling and replacing an entire explanatory framework. This is what makes the emergence of anomaly so critical: it is the first step in scientific revolution.

Importantly, Kuhn reminds us in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that anomalies are always theory-laden. A scientist cannot recognize an anomaly unless they know what should have happened. The very act of noticing something as “wrong” requires the lens of a functioning paradigm. Thus, scientific discovery is never neutral—it is deeply entangled with prior expectations.

This chapter marks the beginning of Kuhn’s revolutionary arc. It shows that science’s greatest transformations arise not from grand ambition, but from relentless pursuit of puzzles that don’t yield. These anomalies fester at the margins of normal science until they can no longer be ignored.

In emphasizing this, Kuhn redefines scientific discovery: not as the heroic uncovering of new truths, but as the recognition that something doesn’t fit—and the courage to look again. This human, tension-filled process is what makes The Structure of Scientific Revolutions an enduring and essential work in the philosophy of science.

Chapter VII: Crisis and the Emergence of Scientific Theories

In Chapter VII of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, “Crisis and the Emergence of Scientific Theories,” Thomas Kuhn moves deeper into the dynamics of paradigm breakdown. While Chapter VI showed how anomalies emerge, this chapter explains what happens when anomalies become impossible to ignore. Kuhn introduces a critical phase in the lifecycle of scientific progress: crisis.

A crisis begins when the anomalies within a paradigm accumulate beyond tolerance. Kuhn describes this as a moment when “a discrepancy between the theory and nature leads repeatedly to failure in normal problem-solving” (p. 66). In other words, normal science can no longer do its job. The once-productive puzzle-solving machinery stalls. Researchers become frustrated. Their confidence in the paradigm—once unwavering—starts to erode.

Importantly, not every anomaly leads to a crisis. Science often tolerates mismatches between theory and observation. But when anomalies are persistent, central, and reproducible, they can lead to growing doubt within the scientific community. Kuhn compares this growing instability to a political crisis: when government can no longer address the needs of its citizens, revolution brews. So too in science.

Kuhn writes, “Failure of existing rules is the prelude to a search for new ones” (p. 68). In crisis, the rigid rules of normal science are loosened. Scientists begin to experiment with new approaches, alternative hypotheses, and sometimes radical re-interpretations of known data. The previously unshakable paradigm is now questioned, and a fertile space opens for what Kuhn calls extraordinary science—the breeding ground of revolutionary change.

This is the phase where scientific creativity becomes visible again. Kuhn emphasizes that “crisis loosens the rules of normal puzzle-solving in ways that ultimately permit a new paradigm to emerge” (p. 86). Importantly, this is not a calm or consensus-driven process. Competing schools of thought may form, debates may rage, and the scientific community may become fragmented. Some cling to the old paradigm; others take risks with untested ideas.

A famous historical example Kuhn references is the crisis in astronomy leading up to Copernicus. The Ptolemaic system had long explained planetary motion, but by the late Middle Ages, it became so unwieldy with its epicycles and corrections that its predictive power—and its elegance—declined. Copernicus’ heliocentric model emerged not in a vacuum, but from a period of increasing dissatisfaction and conceptual stagnation.

Kuhn also makes it clear that crisis alone is not enough. For a revolution to take place, an alternative theory must be proposed, one capable of resolving the anomalies and opening new lines of inquiry. But crisis is the emotional and intellectual rupture that makes such alternatives desirable—if not necessary.

This chapter reveals the deeply human element in science: doubt, disillusionment, and creative exploration under pressure. It is in this fragile, transitional phase that science shows its most dynamic and dramatic face. Kuhn’s insight into crisis as an engine of change is one of the reasons why The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is heralded as a top 100 nonfiction book of all time. It doesn’t just explain how science works—it shows how science struggles, breaks, and reinvents itself.

Chapter VIII: The Response to Crisis

In Chapter VIII, “The Response to Crisis,” Thomas Kuhn builds on the turmoil described in Chapter VII, showing us what happens when a scientific community is thrown into a state of uncertainty. He emphasizes that crisis is not merely confusion—it’s a deeply transformative phase, one that opens the possibility for revolutionary change but doesn’t guarantee it. This chapter captures the psychological, social, and intellectual flux that occurs when scientists can no longer rely on the tools and assumptions that once guided their work.

Kuhn begins by acknowledging that the first response to crisis is often a deepened effort to preserve the paradigm. Scientists tend to “devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict” (p. 78). This is not stubbornness—it’s loyalty to a system that has, until now, successfully explained the world. The community does not abandon a paradigm at the first sign of trouble; instead, they explore every avenue to save it.

But eventually, as Kuhn writes, “the very inadequacy of these articulations and modifications becomes the source of crisis” (p. 79). Scientists begin to lose faith. New ideas and models—once considered fringe—gain attention. The field becomes fragmented as different groups propose different solutions. Debate intensifies. Previously ignored anomalies are now central to discussions. Confidence in the foundational assumptions of the field wanes.

This moment, Kuhn notes, is ripe for extraordinary science—a period of creativity where scientists are freed from the constraints of the old paradigm and begin to think outside its conceptual box. Importantly, this is not a linear or orderly process. Kuhn writes, “In the face of crisis, scientists take a different attitude toward existing paradigms, and the nature of their research changes” (p. 83).

During crisis, science becomes more philosophical. Researchers begin to question the underlying logic and assumptions of their work—something they usually avoid during periods of normal science. Kuhn notes that scientists in crisis may turn to “philosophy or to debate over fundamentals” (p. 88), and in this sense, crisis reveals the epistemological fragility of science. It shows that science is not an unshakable march toward truth but a historically situated human endeavor.

Kuhn illustrates this with historical examples, such as the development of quantum mechanics, which emerged in response to failures in classical physics to explain atomic behavior. The resistance to new ideas was strong at first—but as the old framework continued to fail, more scientists began to explore radical alternatives.

Chapter VIII of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions thus captures the emotional and intellectual atmosphere of crisis: one of confusion, anxiety, and innovation. It is a period marked by freedom from convention but also instability. This is the calm before the revolutionary storm, and Kuhn masterfully portrays the tension that arises when a scientific community stands at the edge of transformation.

This nuanced depiction of scientific crisis—so human, so relatable—is one reason The Structure of Scientific Revolutions remains a timeless philosophical classic. It reorients our understanding of science, showing that before every revolution is a moment of deep vulnerability, and from that vulnerability, the seeds of progress are sown.

Chapter IX: The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions

In Chapter IX of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, “The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions,” Thomas Kuhn delivers one of the most pivotal arguments of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: that scientific progress does not occur through steady, cumulative growth, but rather through revolutions that overthrow existing paradigms and replace them with new ones. This chapter is the core of Kuhn’s thesis, and it redefined the philosophy of science for generations.

Kuhn writes, “The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another” (p. 77). Scientific revolutions occur when the dominant paradigm—once trusted and stable—can no longer accommodate the accumulating anomalies. Instead of fixing or modifying the old paradigm, the scientific community adopts an entirely new framework. This shift is not just in theories, but in the very worldview of the practitioners.

This is what makes revolutions in science so disruptive yet necessary. As Kuhn explains, “To reject one paradigm without simultaneously substituting another is to reject science itself” (p. 79). Science cannot function without a shared set of assumptions, methods, and standards. Thus, paradigms do not simply reflect scientific knowledge; they define what counts as science in the first place.

Kuhn compares scientific revolutions to political revolutions: both involve a crisis in authority, a period of instability, and ultimately, the emergence of a new regime. The comparison is not superficial. Just as political revolutions replace one ruling system with another, scientific revolutions replace the ruling intellectual order. They are moments of profound transformation, not just of knowledge, but of how knowledge is pursued.

Importantly, Kuhn rejects the idea that new paradigms are adopted purely because they are “truer” in an objective sense. Instead, they are adopted because they solve problems that the old paradigm could not, open up new avenues of research, and offer a more coherent or elegant model.

He writes, “The choice is not and cannot be determined merely by the evaluative procedures characteristic of normal science, for these depend in part upon a particular paradigm” (p. 94). In other words, paradigm choice is not purely rational or empirical; it involves values, aesthetics, persuasion, and community consensus.

This challenges the traditional Enlightenment ideal of science as a linear, rational accumulation of facts. Instead, Kuhn paints a picture of science as episodic and discontinuous, moving forward not by perfecting old ideas but by abandoning them for new ones. These ruptures are not failures—they are what allow science to grow.

Chapter IX is perhaps the most controversial and revolutionary part of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. It asserts that truth in science is not absolute but paradigm-dependent, and that progress is made not by inching closer to truth, but by breaking away from flawed past visions. This is why Kuhn’s book has had such an enduring impact—it reshaped our understanding of scientific development itself.

By redefining progress as a sequence of revolutions, Kuhn brought science down from its pedestal of pure rationality and showed it as a human, historical, and socially embedded enterprise. That profound shift is why The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is still considered one of the top 100 nonfiction books—and among the most important books ever written on the nature of science.

Chapter X: Revolutions as Changes of World View

In Chapter X of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, titled “Revolutions as Changes of World View,” Thomas Kuhn deepens his thesis by exploring what scientific revolutions actually mean for the way scientists perceive the world. This chapter is philosophical, even existential. Kuhn moves beyond discussing theories and paradigms to argue that a scientific revolution fundamentally changes how scientists “see” reality itself.

Kuhn writes, “What were ducks in the scientist’s world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards” (p. 111). This metaphor, drawn from Wittgenstein’s famous duck-rabbit illusion, illustrates that paradigms are not just interpretive tools—they structure perception. After a paradigm shift, scientists do not just interpret old facts differently; they perceive different facts altogether.

The core argument here is that scientific revolutions result in a shift of world view, or Weltanschauung. It’s not that the world itself changes—but the way scientists conceptualize, categorize, and interact with it does. Kuhn provocatively states, “After a revolution, scientists are responding to a different world” (p. 121). This suggests that paradigms don’t simply guide thought—they shape experience.

Kuhn uses historical examples to clarify this radical idea. Before Copernicus, the sun was universally understood to rise and set around a stationary Earth. After Copernicus, Earth was in motion, and the sun was stationary—despite the sensory experience remaining unchanged. Similarly, before Lavoisier, combustion was understood via the phlogiston theory. After Lavoisier, combustion involved oxygen—requiring a complete transformation of chemical concepts. As Kuhn puts it, “Lavoisier saw oxygen where Priestley had seen dephlogisticated air” (p. 118).

The implications are profound. Different paradigms are incommensurable—they cannot be fully translated or compared because they arise from distinct conceptual worlds.

Kuhn insists that in many cases, there is no neutral language or shared metric by which two competing paradigms can be evaluated. “In paradigm debates, there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community,” he writes (p. 94). Thus, scientific revolutions are not purely logical debates—they are conversion experiences that reshape how scientists engage with reality.

Kuhn clarifies that these shifts are not irrational, but they are non-cumulative. A new paradigm does not simply add to the old; it replaces it and reinterprets its foundations. This challenges the Enlightenment model of science as a steady march toward truth. Instead, Kuhn shows science as a human endeavor—rich with disagreement, shaped by culture, and vulnerable to shifts in collective perception.

Critics have accused Kuhn of relativism, but he does not deny reality. Rather, he reveals that our access to reality is always mediated by paradigms, and that science, though powerful, does not transcend historical context.

This chapter is where Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions reaches its philosophical peak. It invites readers to question not just how science changes, but how our understanding of reality is itself contingent on shared systems of thought. It’s one of the reasons The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is more than a history book—it is a radical lens through which we view science, knowledge, and truth itself.

Chapter XI: The Invisibility of Revolutions

In Chapter XI of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, “The Invisibility of Revolutions,” Thomas Kuhn makes a startling claim: scientific revolutions often go unnoticed—even by the scientists who live through them. This is not because they are unimportant, but because the structure of science and its educational systems are designed to erase the traces of past revolutions, presenting science instead as a continuous and cumulative progression.

Kuhn writes, “Textbooks… obscure the existence and significance of scientific revolutions” (p. 137). After a paradigm shift, the new science tends to rewrite the past to make it appear that history naturally led to the current state of knowledge. The older paradigm is not taught as a valid framework that once guided real inquiry—it is usually dismissed as a primitive error, an outdated step on the road to truth.

This phenomenon creates the illusion of continuous progress, when in fact, Kuhn argues, the real history of science is punctuated by abrupt transformations. Each revolution—be it the Copernican, Newtonian, Lavoisier’s chemical revolution, or Einstein’s relativistic turn—represented not the natural evolution of previous knowledge, but a wholesale replacement of the existing worldview.

Kuhn highlights how textbooks play a crucial role in this distortion. They are not neutral records of scientific knowledge, but “pedagogic vehicles for the perpetuation of normal science” (p. 137). They present facts as eternal truths, abstracted from their revolutionary origins, and omit the messy, contested, and often political process that brought them into being.

This invisibility serves a purpose: it preserves the authority of the current paradigm. Teaching science as stable and cumulative makes it easier to train students into accepted methods and concepts. But it also creates a false sense of historical continuity—what Kuhn calls the “Orwellian rewriting of history” in scientific culture.

For example, Newton’s laws are often taught as the culmination of prior thought, when in truth, they represented a dramatic departure from Aristotelian physics. Similarly, Lavoisier’s introduction of the concept of “oxygen” replaced—not refined—the dominant phlogiston theory. These were revolutions, yet textbooks typically portray them as incremental improvements.

Kuhn’s point here is not to accuse science of dishonesty, but to reveal how the structure of scientific education and communication is biased toward stability, not disruption. Scientific communities value order, and revolutions are inherently disorderly. Hence, after the dust settles, the revolutionary becomes the new orthodoxy—and its radical nature is gradually forgotten.

This chapter is essential to understanding Kuhn’s larger message: science is a deeply human enterprise, shaped by memory, culture, and pedagogy. Its revolutions are real—but they are often buried under layers of retrospective rationalization.

By making this phenomenon visible, Kuhn adds another layer to why The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is so widely celebrated. He not only changed how we think about science—he showed us how science thinks about itself, and how that self-image is carefully constructed.

Chapter XII: The Resolution of Revolutions

In Chapter XII, “The Resolution of Revolutions,” Thomas Kuhn tackles a central question: how do scientific communities resolve the deep conflicts that arise during a revolution? What causes scientists to ultimately abandon one paradigm and accept another when, as he has shown, the two are often incommensurable?

Kuhn begins with a bold assertion: “As in political revolutions, so in paradigm choice—there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community” (p. 94). In other words, paradigm shifts are not the result of a single experiment or logical proof. Instead, they are social, communal decisions, influenced by persuasion, generational change, and subjective judgments of explanatory power, simplicity, and future potential.

During normal science, rules are clear and disputes are technical. But in revolutionary science, rules themselves are up for grabs. This leads to what Kuhn calls “extraordinary science,” where different schools propose rival paradigms and debate fundamental assumptions. Because there is no neutral framework for comparison, Kuhn likens this stage to a conversion experience: “The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience that cannot be forced” (p. 150).

Yet, despite the chaos, resolution does come. Kuhn outlines several mechanisms:

• Persuasion through success: The new paradigm may solve key problems the old one could not (e.g., heliocentrism explaining retrograde motion).
• Exemplars: Clear, elegant solutions to puzzles persuade others to adopt the new approach.
• Younger scientists: As Max Planck famously noted, “Science advances one funeral at a time.” Kuhn agrees that paradigm shifts often coincide with generational turnover.

Importantly, Kuhn emphasizes that paradigms are not chosen just for their truth, but for their ability to open new avenues of research, offer coherence, and promise fruitful future work. He writes, “The new paradigm is accepted because it is more successful than its competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute” (p. 157).

This perspective challenges the notion that science is wholly objective. Kuhn doesn’t deny the role of evidence—but he shows that interpretation of evidence is always paradigm-bound. What one scientist sees as “confirmation,” another might see as “irrelevant,” depending on their underlying framework.

Still, Kuhn is not suggesting that paradigm choice is arbitrary. He asserts that new paradigms must earn their place—they are adopted because they work better within the values and goals of the scientific community. These values include accuracy, simplicity, explanatory power, and coherence with other accepted theories.

By revealing the subjective and sociological nature of scientific change, Kuhn humanizes science. He shows us that science is not a sterile algorithm but a living, evolving culture of thought, shaped by debate, persuasion, imagination, and consensus.

This chapter is vital in understanding why The Structure of Scientific Revolutions remains a foundational work in both philosophy and history of science. It teaches us that truth in science is negotiated through struggle—a process as dynamic and complex as any human endeavor.

Chapter XIII: Progress Through Revolutions

In Chapter XIII, “Progress Through Revolutions,” Thomas Kuhn offers a reflective and nuanced resolution to the philosophical tension at the heart of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: If scientific revolutions overthrow previous paradigms, and if competing paradigms are incommensurable, then can we still speak of scientific progress?

Kuhn’s answer is a qualified yes. He argues that even though revolutions disrupt continuity, they still lead to genuine progress within science, albeit in a non-linear, non-cumulative fashion. As he puts it, “Scientific revolutions are here taken to be the tradition-shattering complements to the tradition-bound activity of normal science” (p. 92). Science progresses not by gradually revealing the absolute truth, but by breaking free from outdated frameworks that can no longer sustain inquiry.

Progress, according to Kuhn, should not be defined as convergence toward a final truth. Instead, he suggests an alternative criterion: the ability of a new paradigm to solve more puzzles, open new fields of research, and provide a more coherent worldview than its predecessor. “A scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternative candidate is available to take its place,” Kuhn explains (p. 77). In other words, science moves forward by offering better problem-solving capacity, not by revealing eternal facts.

Kuhn points out that scientific communities continue to believe in progress even after a revolution—because the new paradigm feels more effective, more elegant, and more explanatory than the one it replaced. But he warns us that this progress is always local and contingent. What we gain in explanatory power, we may lose in familiarity or breadth of applicability. Thus, progress is not toward truth, but away from limitations.

This chapter also revisits the psychological and pedagogical effects of revolutions. Kuhn notes that, once adopted, a new paradigm becomes the new normal. It reshapes education, redefines problems, and determines what counts as valid science. Over time, the memory of the revolution fades, and science appears continuous once again—until the next anomaly emerges.

Kuhn explicitly rejects the idea of a final scientific truth. Instead, he aligns his view with Darwinian evolution: just as species evolve not toward perfection but in response to changing environments, scientific knowledge evolves in response to shifting intellectual landscapes and internal pressures. This metaphor is crucial: it redefines progress not as destination, but as adaptive transformation.

He closes with a powerful reminder: “Scientific revolutions… are the only means by which science is preserved as a uniquely powerful instrument for extending the bounds of human knowledge” (p. 163). For Kuhn, revolutions are not disruptions to science—they are its lifeblood.

This final chapter cements Kuhn’s legacy. He offers a radically honest vision of science: not perfect, not purely objective, but human, dynamic, and self-correcting. It is this deeply resonant, humanized picture of science that makes The Structure of Scientific Revolutions one of the most cited academic works of all time, and rightly included among the 100 greatest nonfiction and history books ever written.

Highlighted Summary Box: Main Themes, Concepts, and Lessons

Kuhn Postscript 1969

In the Postscript (1969), added to the second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn directly addresses criticisms, clarifies his terminology—especially the misunderstood concept of “paradigm”—and reinforces the central themes of his original argument. This section is both defensive and elaborative, offering readers a clearer philosophical scaffolding for interpreting the main text.

Clarifying “Paradigm”

Perhaps the most important purpose of the Postscript is to explain what Kuhn meant by “paradigm”, a term that had by then taken on a life of its own in academic and popular discourse. He admits the term had been used too loosely in the original edition, saying:

“The paradigm as shared example is the central element of what I now take to be the most novel and least understood aspect of this book.” (p. 186)

Kuhn distinguishes between two senses of the term:

1. Global Paradigm: The overarching worldview or disciplinary matrix accepted by a scientific community (e.g., Newtonian mechanics).
2. Local Paradigm / Exemplar: Concrete problem-solutions (like classic experiments, models, or equations) that serve as examples for solving new puzzles.

He suggests that the term exemplar might have been better suited to describe the second meaning, and he acknowledges that the term “paradigm” had become overloaded and confusing. Nevertheless, both senses are crucial: paradigms are not just abstract theories; they also include tacit knowledge, shared values, standard techniques, and practical norms.

Paradigm and Scientific Community

Kuhn stresses that scientific paradigms are community-bound. A paradigm cannot exist in isolation—it exists only where there is a group of practitioners who share it. These communities, whether large (e.g., physics) or small (e.g., a specific subfield like crystallography), are defined by their adherence to shared exemplars, methods, and problem-sets. Thus, paradigm shifts are also shifts in community identity.

He also clarifies that normal science proceeds within the boundaries of a paradigm and is defined by it. But when anomalies mount and normal puzzle-solving fails, a crisis leads to the extraordinary science that precedes revolution.

Incommensurability Revisited

Another major theme Kuhn revisits is incommensurability, a term that caused significant controversy. Kuhn emphasizes that he does not mean paradigms are incomparable in all ways. Rather, they are linguistically and conceptually incommensurable—they do not share the same definitions, standards, or interpretive tools.

Kuhn clarifies:

“What the participants in a communication breakdown can do is recognize each other as members of different language communities and then become translators” (p. 202).

In other words, understanding across paradigms is possible—but it requires relearning the rules and worldview of the other paradigm, almost as if learning a foreign language.

Final Reflections

Kuhn closes the Postscript by affirming that the structure he described is not unique to science, but perhaps most sharply illustrated by it. He restates that revolutions are not irrational—they are deeply embedded in the historical, linguistic, and psychological fabric of how knowledge evolves.

“Scientific knowledge… evolves as a series of peaceful interludes punctuated by intellectually violent revolutions” (p. 208).

This Postscript is Kuhn’s final calibration—he does not retreat from his bold claims, but rather, offers a more refined vocabulary and philosophical lens. It cements his work as not merely a history of science, but a profound reflection on how humans construct and reconstruct reality through shared systems of thought.

Critical Analysis

A. Evaluation of Content

Kuhn’s argument is based on historical case studies—the Copernican Revolution, the shift from Newtonian mechanics to relativity, and the rise of quantum theory. He doesn’t drown the reader in data, but each example powerfully reinforces his point. He shows that scientists rarely discard a theory because of a single contradictory result. Instead, they wait until a new theory is ready to take its place.

Kuhn is not dismissive of science; he deeply respects it. But he also shows how it is a human activity—guided by community, belief, and even politics. This makes The Structure of Scientific Revolutions deeply grounded, even if it unsettles those who believe in a purely objective science.

B. Style and Accessibility

Kuhn’s style is intellectual, elegant, and occasionally dense. He’s not writing a self-help guide; he’s trying to shift your worldview. Still, he’s aware of his audience and explains philosophical points with relatable analogies, like puzzle-solving or gestalt image switches.

C. Themes and Relevance

The themes of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions remain as relevant as ever. In an age dominated by rapid technological change and mistrust in scientific institutions, Kuhn’s insights offer a more honest, more human look at how science evolves. The shift from Newton to Einstein, or the rise of machine learning, are modern-day revolutions that fit neatly into Kuhn’s structure.

D. Author’s Authority

As a trained physicist and historian, Kuhn is perfectly placed to write The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. He combines rigorous logic with historical analysis. His background in physics gives him deep insight into the actual practice of science—something many philosophers lack.

Strengths and Weaknesses

Strengths

a) A Revolutionary Framework for Understanding Science

Kuhn didn’t just write about revolutions—he caused one in the philosophy of science. His concept of paradigm shifts has become a part of everyday language, not just academic discourse. As Ian Hacking noted in the introductory essay, “Great books are rare. This is one”.

b) Rich Historical and Philosophical Insight

Kuhn draws from an impressive range of sources—astronomy, chemistry, physics, psychology—and builds his argument with historical precision and philosophical clarity. His background in both physics and the humanities adds credibility and depth to his arguments.

c) Humanizes the Scientific Enterprise

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions demystifies science. It shows scientists as people embedded in communities, responding not just to data but to cultural norms, crises, and emotional attachments. This resonates in today’s world where trust in scientific authority is both critical and questioned.

d) Inspires Interdisciplinary Research

Kuhn’s work birthed or influenced entire fields: science and technology studies, history of science, cognitive science, and sociology of knowledge. Even corporate strategy and innovation studies borrow from Kuhn’s paradigm model.

Weaknesses

a) Ambiguity in Terminology

The word paradigm is used in over 20 different ways in the book, as noted by critic Margaret Masterman. Kuhn himself admitted in later writings, “I lost control of the word.” The vagueness caused confusion, diluting its analytical precision.

b) Limited Scope

Kuhn draws mostly from the physical sciences—astronomy, chemistry, and physics. He gives minimal attention to biology, psychology, or social sciences, where revolutions may operate differently or less cleanly.

c) Lack of Clear Theory of Truth

Kuhn avoids discussing truth directly, which critics see as evasive. Though he questions the idea of one objective truth, he doesn’t fully develop an alternative epistemology. This gave postmodern skeptics a loophole he never intended.

d) Underdeveloped Sociology

While Structure is rich in community language, it lacks empirical social science. Kuhn didn’t integrate systematic data or sociological methodology. Later scholars in science studies had to fill this gap.

Reception, Criticism, and Influence

A Cultural Phenomenon

Upon publication in 1962, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions sold modestly. But once the paperback hit in 1965, it became a cultural phenomenon. By 1987, over 650,000 copies were sold. It was one of the most cited academic books of the 20th century, ranking up there with Freud and Marx.

Academic Influence

Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions reshaped entire disciplines:

• Philosophy of Science: It challenged the logical positivism of Popper and Carnap.
• History of Science: It shifted focus from linear progress to rupture and crisis.
• Sociology of Knowledge: It laid the groundwork for science studies and actor-network theory.

Criticism

a) Karl Popper and the Falsificationists

Popper accused Kuhn of legitimizing “mob psychology” in science by emphasizing consensus over rational critique. Kuhn responded by distinguishing his historical-descriptive model from Popper’s normative one.

b) Relativism Accusation

Critics like Alan Sokal accused Kuhn of promoting relativism. Kuhn strongly denied this, stating in his postscript that he was a “fact lover and truth seeker”. He rejected the notion that all paradigms are equally valid.

c) Feminist and Postcolonial Responses

Later thinkers asked: whose paradigms are being discussed? Feminist and postcolonial scholars critiqued Kuhn’s silence on gender, race, and geopolitics in shaping scientific communities.

Kuhn’s Response

Kuhn stayed calm amid the storm. He wrote clarifying essays like “Second Thoughts on Paradigms” and updated his postscript in later editions. Yet, he admitted some regrets—especially the misuse of “paradigm shift” in corporate and marketing lingo.

Notable Quotations (With Context)

Here are some of Kuhn’s most powerful insights from the text:

“Normal science… is predicated on the assumption that the scientific community knows what the world is like.”
— Chapter II: The Route to Normal Science

“The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another.”
— Chapter VIII: The Response to Crisis

“After Copernicus, astronomers lived in a different world.”
— Chapter X: Revolutions as Changes of World View

“Scientific revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense… that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately.”
— Chapter VII: Crisis and the Emergence of Scientific Theories

“The historian of science may be tempted to exclaim that when paradigms change, the world itself changes with them.”
— Chapter X, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

“Progress is not toward a goal but away from the inadequacies of the past.”
— Chapter XIII: Progress Through Revolutions

Each of these reflects Kuhn’s fundamental view: science is not merely about facts and logic, but about communities, crises, and the reshaping of perception.

Comparison with Similar Works

vs. Karl Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery

Popper emphasized falsifiability—that science progresses by rejecting false theories. Kuhn emphasized paradigm stability and rupture. Where Popper saw science as rational and incremental, Kuhn saw it as communal and revolutionary.

vs. Imre Lakatos’ Research Programmes

Lakatos tried to reconcile Kuhn and Popper, proposing that science proceeds via competing research programs. Unlike Kuhn, Lakatos stressed rational criteria for theory choice over community consensus.

vs. Paul Feyerabend’s Against Method

Feyerabend extended Kuhn’s critique into a full-blown anarchist approach to science. Kuhn distanced himself, insisting he still believed in progress and scientific values.

vs. Bruno Latour’s Science in Action

Latour built on Kuhn’s ideas but emphasized the messy, political, and performative nature of science. Latour’s actor-network theory goes beyond Kuhn by focusing on machines, texts, and institutions—not just scientists.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Final Impressions

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is one of those rare books that permanently alters how you see the world—not just science, but how human knowledge grows. It strips away the myth of linear progress and shows us the chaotic, emotional, and communal life of science. Kuhn gave language to the invisible: to the crisis before the breakthrough, the doubt behind the data, and the worldview shifts that make old truths irrelevant.

It’s a book of ideas, yes—but it’s also a book of human nature. Kuhn’s scientists are not cold logic machines; they’re thinkers, believers, skeptics, and rebels.

Who Should Read This Book?

Reading Kuhn is like putting on new glasses: the world looks the same, yet utterly changed. After finishing The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, you’ll find it hard to use the word “progress” without pausing—and that’s a good thing. Because in Kuhn’s world, to question is not to regress, but to grow.

FAQ Questions & Answers

1. What is the main argument of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions?

In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn argues that science does not progress linearly through steady fact accumulation but through disruptive paradigm shifts that reshape entire worldviews.

2. What does Thomas Kuhn mean by a “paradigm shift”?

A paradigm shift is a fundamental change in scientific thinking that replaces one framework with another—like switching from Newtonian physics to Einstein’s relativity.

3. What are examples of scientific revolutions in history?

Major examples include the Copernican revolution (heliocentrism), the Newtonian revolution (classical mechanics), and the quantum revolution (modern physics).

4. What is the difference between normal science and revolutionary science?

Normal science works within an existing paradigm to solve puzzles, while revolutionary science arises when anomalies lead to a breakdown and replacement of the paradigm.

5. What is “incommensurability” in Kuhn’s theory?

Incommensurability means two paradigms are not directly comparable due to differing assumptions, definitions, and standards—almost like speaking different languages.

6. How does Kuhn’s theory challenge the traditional view of science?

He rejects the idea of science as purely objective and cumulative, instead emphasizing historical contingency, community influence, and subjective perception.

7. Why is The Structure of Scientific Revolutions considered controversial?

Because it implies that scientific progress is not entirely rational or truth-driven, but shaped by social factors, persuasion, and paradigm-dependent thinking.

8. What is the significance of the 1969 Postscript in Kuhn’s book?

The Postscript clarifies misunderstood terms like “paradigm” and “incommensurability,” and reinforces Kuhn’s idea that scientific change is community-driven.

9. How does Kuhn’s idea of science compare to Karl Popper’s?

Popper saw science as falsification of hypotheses through testing. Kuhn emphasized long periods of puzzle-solving under paradigms, punctuated by revolutions.

10. Why is Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions still relevant today?

Because it applies beyond science—Kuhn’s ideas influence how we think about change in politics, education, culture, and technology. It’s about how we change ideas.