Free Will and Determinism: Is Free Will a Lie? The Ultimate Battle for Human Agency and How Free Will and Determinism Shape Your Destiny

The age-old debate between free will and determinism continues to captivate philosophers, scientists, and psychologists alike.

At its core, the discussion revolves around a fundamental question: Are our thoughts, choices, and actions genuinely free, or are they the inevitable consequences of prior causes? Free will suggests that humans possess the ability to make decisions independently, unbound by external forces or predetermined events.

In contrast, determinism argues that every action is the result of an unbroken chain of prior occurrences, shaped by biology, environment, and natural laws. This philosophical conflict holds profound implications for personal responsibility, moral accountability, and our understanding of human behavior.

If our decisions are not truly free, can we be held responsible for our actions? Or, if we do have genuine agency, how do we reconcile that with the scientific view of a world governed by cause and effect? 

In the realm of psychology, the free will vs. determinism debate is especially significant when examining human emotions and behavior. Emotions—often seen as spontaneous and deeply personal—raise complex questions about the extent of our control. Are feelings of love, anger, or guilt freely chosen, or are they automatic responses to prior experiences and biological processes?

What is Free will?

Free will is one of the most profound and debated concepts in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. At its core, free will refers to the ability of individuals to make choices free from external constraints or predetermination.

Meghan Griffith defines free will as “the power to make choices”.²¹This ability to choose, however, comes under scrutiny when examined through the lens of determinism, a theory that suggests all events, including human actions, are the inevitable result of preceding events.

Philosophers often distinguish between free action and free will. As Gary Watson⁶⁰ explains, a person may be free to act as they wish, but whether they are truly free to choose their desires and intentions is another matter.

This distinction has significant implications for moral responsibility, as individuals may only be held accountable for actions they freely choose.

What is Determinism?

Determinism posits that every event is causally necessitated by preceding events and the laws of nature. This concept is often characterized as follows:

“The past and the laws of nature necessitate a unique future.”²⁰

Determinism implies that given the state of the universe at any given time, everything that follows is inevitable. This perspective is rooted in classical mechanics and the scientific principle of causality. Meghan Griffith notes that determinism does not require an intelligent entity to predetermine events; rather, it follows naturally from the laws governing the universe.²¹

According to Syndey Hook determinism “is the view that all events are caused….. And what is meant by saying that an event is caused? The natural answer is that the event is so connected with some preceding event that unless the latter had occurred the former would not have occurred. Indeterminism means the denial of this.²⁸

Free will vs. Determinism

The debate over free will and determinism is a deeply entrenched philosophical conflict with profound implications for human identity, morality, and responsibility.

At the heart of the debate lies the question: Are human beings truly autonomous agents, or are their choices entirely dictated by prior causes and external forces?

This discourse has led philosophers to adopt various positions, broadly categorized into incompatibilism, compatibilism, and libertarianism. Each stance provides distinct answers regarding the nature of human agency, moral responsibility, and the structure of causation in decision-making processes.

1. Incompatibilism

Incompatibilists argue that free will and determinism are mutually exclusive. If every action is preordained by past events and natural laws, then genuine freedom of choice is illusory.

Peter van Inwagen defends incompatibilism by positing the “Consequence Argument,” which states that if determinism is true, then people can never truly act otherwise, making moral responsibility questionable.⁵⁶

Sam Harris (2012) further supports this position, arguing that even our thoughts, emotions, and decisions are the result of unconscious neurological processes, leaving no room for free.²³

Some extreme forms of incompatibilism, such as “hard determinism,” maintain that moral responsibility is a misguided notion, as human behavior is ultimately out of individual control.

A related view, “hard incompatibilism,” proposed by Derk Pereboom, asserts that regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism is true, humans lack the type of free will necessary for moral responsibility.⁴⁸

Critics of incompatibilism argue that rejecting free will entirely leads to difficulties in assigning moral blame or praise. As Alfred Mele (2006) suggests, the perception of agency and deliberation might still play a crucial role in human behavior even if determinism holds.⁴¹

Some incompatibilists propose “event-causal libertarianism,” which holds that although determinism is false, human choices are still influenced by prior events without being strictly determined by them, allowing for a limited form of agency.

Incompatibilists argue that free will and determinism are mutually exclusive. If every action is preordained by past events and natural laws, then genuine freedom of choice is illusory.

Some extreme forms of incompatibilism, such as “hard determinism,” maintain that moral responsibility is a misguided notion, as human behavior is ultimately out of individual control.

2. Compatibilism

Compatibilists argue that free will and determinism can coexist. They redefine free will not as an absolute ability to choose otherwise, but as the capacity to act according to one’s desires and rational deliberations.

Harry Frankfurt (1971) introduces the concept of “hierarchical desires,” where an individual possesses free will if they act in accordance with their highest-order desires.²⁵

American philosopher and cognitive scientist Daniel Dennett (1984) supports compatibilism, suggesting that freedom is best understood in terms of decision-making processes that allow for rational reflection, even in a causally determined world.⁸

Some compatibilists, like John Martin Fischer, propose “semi-compatibilism,” which argues that moral responsibility does not require free will in the traditional sense but rather depends on the agent’s responsiveness to reasons.

Thomas Hobbes and David Hume, classical compatibilists, argue that freedom should be understood as the absence of external constraints rather than the ability to have acted otherwise in a given situation.

Compatibilists often refer to “reasons-responsiveness” as a key feature of free will. This means that an agent exercises free will if their decisions are guided by rational deliberation, even if causally determined.²³

Critics argue that compatibilism merely redefines free will in a way that avoids the core metaphysical problem rather than solving it. Galen Strawson (1986) posits that any account of free will that assumes determinism fails to address the fundamental issue of true origination of choices.⁵⁶

Recent cognitive science research has suggested that decision-making involves both deterministic and probabilistic elements, supporting a nuanced compatibilist interpretation of free will.⁴³

3. Libertarianism

Libertarians reject determinism and argue that human beings have genuine free will, often grounding their claims in metaphysical or indeterministic principles.

Philosopher Robert Kane introduces the idea of “self-forming actions” (SFAs), where individuals contribute to the shaping of their future actions by making undetermined choices in crucial moments.³⁰

Some libertarians, like agent-causal theorists, argue that humans possess a fundamental power of agency that allows them to initiate new causal chains independent of prior events.

Critics, including Ted Honderich (2002), argue that libertarianism relies too much on speculative interpretations of quantum mechanics and lacks empirical support.²⁷ He contends that appealing to quantum indeterminacy does not sufficiently account for conscious decision-making or provide a coherent basis for moral responsibility.

Furthermore, he suggests that randomness at the quantum level does not equate to meaningful human agency, as true free will would require more than mere probabilistic occurrences—it necessitates a structured mechanism for deliberate choice and intentional action.

The debate remains unresolved, as each position presents challenges and counterarguments. While incompatibilists emphasize the logical constraints of determinism on free agency, compatibilists strive to reconcile human autonomy with causal necessity, and libertarians attempt to preserve a robust conception of free will through metaphysical or indeterministic frameworks. The complexity of this debate underscores the enduring philosophical fascination with human freedom and responsibility.

The relationship between free will and determinism has sparked significant philosophical discourse. The central question is whether free will can exist in a deterministic universe. Philosophers have traditionally fallen into one of three positions:

The Scientific Perspective

Recent neuroscience challenges traditional notions of free will. Experiments by American neuroscientist Benjamin Libet suggest that unconscious brain activity precedes conscious decision-making, implying that choices may not be as free as they seem.³⁵ However, some argue that these findings do not entirely negate free will but rather indicate a more complex interaction between conscious and unconscious processes.

The question of free will and determinism is not merely an abstract philosophical debate—it has profound implications for ethics, law, and personal identity.

If determinism is true, does it absolve individuals of moral responsibility? If free will exists, how do we reconcile it with scientific findings on causality?

Despite centuries of debate, no definitive answer has emerged. What remains clear is that the discussion itself is crucial. As Bob Doyle⁹ argues, the “scandal” of free will is that we have yet to fully comprehend it, but acknowledging this mystery is itself a testament to human intellectual curiosity.

In the end, whether we are free agents or merely passengers in a predetermined universe, the pursuit of understanding remains one of the most profound aspects of human existence.

Classical and Modern Philosophy of Free Will

The debate over free will has been a cornerstone of philosophical discourse for centuries. Classical perspectives on free will were largely shaped by metaphysical and theological considerations, whereas modern approaches integrate insights from science, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience.

This part examines the classical and modern perspectives on free will, drawing from seminal works in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience.

Classical Philosophy of Free Will

Classical libertarians argue that free will is incompatible with determinism. The notion that individuals possess the ability to make choices independent of past events and external influences is central to this view.

As Robert Kane notes, libertarian free will entails “ultimate responsibility”.³⁰ This means that agents are the ultimate originators of their actions, without being causally determined by prior events.

Furthermore, Kane emphasizes the role of “self-forming actions” (SFAs), moments in an individual’s life where the person makes a crucial decision that is not entirely predetermined by past events but is instead influenced by their character, values, and reasoning.³⁰ These SFAs provide the foundation for genuine moral responsibility. Additionally, libertarians argue that randomness alone cannot account for free will; rather, it must be the result of deliberate agent causation, where the individual actively initiates action instead of being merely subjected to external causal forces.⁴¹

This distinction between randomness and agent causation remains a critical aspect of libertarian thought on free will.

Augustine

Saint Augustine’s view on free will was deeply theological, emphasizing human moral responsibility.

According to Augustine, free will is a gift from God that allows individuals to choose between good and evil. However, he also argued that divine foreknowledge does not negate free will, as God’s omniscience does not necessitate predestination but rather a perfect knowledge of all possible choices.³⁰ Augustine’s perspective introduced the idea that human free will is compatible with divine governance, shaping later discussions in Christian theology and philosophy.

He further elaborated on this in his works De Libero Arbitrio and The City of God, where he suggests that while humans have the capacity for free choice, their moral responsibility is tied to divine grace. This reconciliation between divine omniscience and human freedom set the foundation for later philosophical debates, influencing thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas and later Protestant theologians like John Calvin.

Descartes

René Descartes proposed that free will is a fundamental aspect of human rationality.

He distinguished between external constraints and internal volition, asserting that genuine freedom arises from reasoned choices.⁵⁴ Descartes’ dualistic framework, which separates the mind and body, allows for an autonomous will that is not bound by physical determinism. He posited that while the body operates within the laws of physics, the mind—specifically the will—functions independently, governed by reason rather than mechanical causation.

This perspective, deeply rooted in Cartesian dualism, suggests that individuals have the ability to freely direct their thoughts and intentions, making rational deliberation central to the exercise of free will.

However, Descartes also acknowledged that human passions and external influences could obscure rational judgment, leading to impaired or constrained choices, which adds complexity to his view of volitional autonomy.

Hobbes and Compatibilism

In contrast to libertarianism, Thomas Hobbes argued for a deterministic yet compatibilist conception of free will.

He suggested that freedom consists of the absence of external constraints rather than an absence of causation. As he states, “The actions which men voluntarily do… proceed from liberty; and yet every act of man’s will proceedeth from some cause”.²⁸ Hobbes’ compatibilism suggests that as long as individuals are not physically restrained or coerced, their actions can still be considered free, even if they follow deterministic causal chains.

He viewed desires and deliberation as part of natural causes, with human decision-making operating within predictable laws of nature.

This perspective challenged the need for an uncaused will, arguing instead that moral responsibility is compatible with a causally determined universe. Hobbes’ view significantly influenced later compatibilist philosophers such as David Hume and John Stuart Mill, who expanded on the idea that freedom is found in the ability to act according to one’s internal motivations rather than the absence of causality itself.

This compatibilist view laid the groundwork for many modern discussions on free will, particularly in relation to moral responsibility and legal accountability.

Modern Philosophy of Free Will

The rise of scientific determinism in the 19th and 20th centuries posed a major challenge to classical notions of free will.

Deterministic interpretations of human behavior suggested that choices are governed by natural laws, genetic predispositions, and environmental factors. As Daniel Dennett discusses in Freedom Evolves, evolutionary processes have shaped human cognition in ways that introduce constraints on decision-making, making free will an emergent rather than an inherent quality.⁸

Similarly, Paul Singh’s findings suggest that subconscious brain processes initiate decisions before conscious awareness, raising questions about the extent of human autonomy.⁵⁴

This scientific perspective has led many modern philosophers, such as Alfred Mele in Free Will and Luck, to explore nuanced middle-ground positions that attempt to reconcile human agency with deterministic influences.⁴¹

Consequently, contemporary debates continue to grapple with whether free will can exist within a framework that acknowledges both causal determinism and the complexities of human cognition.

Dennett’s Evolutionary Perspective

Daniel Dennett, in Freedom Evolves, argues that free will can be understood within a deterministic framework.

He introduces the concept of “evitability,” where the ability to anticipate and avoid undesirable outcomes constitutes a form of freedom.⁸ He contends that evolution has endowed humans with sophisticated decision-making mechanisms, making free will an emergent property of cognitive processes rather than an illusion. Dennett’s perspective builds upon the idea that free will need not be an uncaused, metaphysical phenomenon, but rather a naturalistic adaptation that enhances survival and decision-making.

He argues that human beings, through evolutionary processes, have developed complex cognitive structures capable of evaluating potential future scenarios and modifying behavior accordingly, thus making actions both determined and flexible.

Additionally, Dennett addresses criticisms by libertarians, emphasizing that freedom in this sense does not require indeterminacy but instead involves an intricate web of causes that allow for rational deliberation and agency within a deterministic universe.

He further illustrates this idea with the concept of degrees of freedom, explaining that while constraints exist, individuals still possess significant control over their actions within the constraints of natural laws.⁸

Mele’s Skeptical Soft Libertarianism

American philosopher Alfred Mele takes a middle-ground approach advocating for a “soft libertarian” perspective.

He acknowledges that while indeterminism may play a role in human decision-making, it does not necessarily undermine moral responsibility.⁴¹ He critiques both strict determinism and radical libertarianism, arguing for a nuanced understanding of autonomy. Mele introduces the concept of “modest libertarianism,” which suggests that free will does not require absolute independence from causal influences but rather an agent’s ability to act according to their rational deliberations and preferences.⁴¹

He further contends that luck should not be viewed as an all-encompassing obstacle to free will but as a manageable factor within decision-making.

Mele’s perspective attempts to reconcile the challenges posed by neuroscientific findings with a practical notion of agency, emphasizing that human choices, while influenced by prior conditions, are still meaningfully free in a way that supports moral responsibility.⁴¹

Neuroscience and the Illusion of Free Will

Recent neuroscientific research has raised significant doubts about the existence of free will.

Studies on brain activity preceding conscious decision-making suggest that neural processes determine actions before individuals become aware of them.

Paul Singh argues that free will is a byproduct of cognitive processes rather than a genuine capacity for independent choice.⁵⁴

Similarly, Krueger and Grüning argue that human decision-making is heavily influenced by subconscious processes. They claim that belief in free will is a psychological construct rather than an ontological reality.³²

Compatibilism in Contemporary Philosophy

Modern compatibilists seek to reconcile free will with determinism. Gary Watson of University of Southern California in his anthology Free Will, presents various perspectives that redefine freedom in terms of reasons-responsiveness and moral responsibility. Frankfurt’s hierarchical model of free will suggests that true freedom lies in the alignment between first-order desires and higher-order volitions.⁶⁰

Frankfurt’s view introduces the concept of “wanton agents,” individuals who act on first-order desires without reflective endorsement from their higher-order volitions, contrasting them with persons who genuinely exercise free will through rational self-governance.²⁵

Additionally, John Martin Fischer expands on reasons-responsiveness by distinguishing between “guidance control,” which is compatible with determinism, and “regulative control,” which requires alternative possibilities.²⁴ Susan Wolf, in Freedom Within Reason, further refines compatibilist views by arguing that free will exists when an agent acts in accordance with rational deliberation and moral considerations, even if their choices are determined.⁶²

This evolving compatibilist framework emphasizes that moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise but instead hinges on the rational capacities of agents within a structured causal framework.

The debate over free will continues to evolve, with classical perspectives emphasizing metaphysical freedom and moral responsibility, while modern theories incorporate scientific insights and compatibilist refinements. Whether free will is an illusion, an emergent property, or a necessary condition for moral responsibility remains an open question.

However, what is clear is that the discussion surrounding free will is integral to our understanding of human agency, ethics, and the nature of consciousness.

Theology and Free Will

The discussion of free will in theology is a deeply rooted debate that stretches across centuries, involving classical philosophers, church fathers, and modern theologians.

It is an inquiry into how human autonomy coexists with divine sovereignty. American Christian systematic theologian, philosopher, and apologist Norman L. Geisler, in his book¹⁶ Chosen But Free, argues for a balanced view that steers between extreme Calvinism and extreme Arminianism, emphasizing that God’s sovereignty and human free will are compatible.

One of the most profound paradoxes in theology is the relationship between God’s sovereignty and human free will.

If God is all-powerful and omniscient, how can humans have genuine freedom? Geisler challenges deterministic views by asserting that sovereignty does not negate human responsibility:

“By ‘determined’ here we do not mean that the act is directly caused by God. It was caused by human free choice (which is a self-determined act). By ‘determined’ it is meant that the inevitability of the event was fixed in advance since God knew infallibly that it would come to pass”.

This perspective aligns with “middle knowledge” (Molinism), which suggests that God’s knowledge of free choices does not eliminate human autonomy.

Geisler rejects hard determinism, especially the Calvinist doctrine of irresistible grace, which suggests that God compels individuals to believe without their consent. He critiques theologians like R.C. Sproul, who argue that man is internally coerced:

“Coercion is coercion whether it is external or internal, and all coercion is contrary to free choice. This is the view of the New Testament and all major church fathers”.

For Geisler, true love and obedience to God must be freely chosen, not imposed.

Augustine vs. Arminius

The debate on free will has deep historical roots. Augustine initially defended free will, but later in his theological evolution, he leaned towards predestination, a doctrine that heavily influenced John Calvin.

On the contrary, Jacob Arminius (1560–1609) rejected the idea that God preordains individuals to heaven or hell. He proposed “conditional election”, stating that salvation is based on foreseen faith rather than divine decree.

Geisler distinguishes between classical Arminianism and modern Wesleyanism, warning against extreme positions:

“What is popularly known as ‘Arminianism’ today is really Wesleyan and not what Jacobus Arminius and his immediate followers held”.

While Arminianism defends free will, extreme forms of it—such as Neotheism or “Openness Theology”—risk denying God’s complete foreknowledge, which Geisler critiques as a theological error.

The debate between Augustine and Arminius represents a theological crossroads regarding predestination and free will. These two figures shaped the primary divisions within Christian theology on salvation, grace, and divine sovereignty.

Augustine’s Shift from Free Will to Predestination

Initially, St. Augustine (354–430 AD) upheld the classical view that human free will plays a crucial role in salvation.

However, during his theological disputes with Pelagius, who denied original sin and claimed humans could choose righteousness without divine grace, Augustine shifted to a doctrine of predestination.

Geisler highlights this shift: “Early Augustine believed in free will, stating that ‘God’s foreknowledge of human actions does not itself impose necessity on them’ (On Free will, 3.3.6). However, in later years, Augustine emphasized predestination, stating that ‘God’s grace alone determines salvation, and without it, man can do no good’ (The Predestination of the Saints, 5.10).”​

His later writings laid the foundation for Calvinist predestination, arguing that salvation was entirely the work of God’s sovereign will.

Augustine’s later view of grace:

Humans are completely depraved due to original sin. Salvation is entirely dependent on God’s predestined will. God chooses some (the elect) to receive His grace, while others are left in their sinful state.

This doctrine was later developed by John Calvin, who further systematized it into five points of Calvinism (TULIP)[1]. Geisler, however, critiques extreme Calvinism for making God seem unjust:

“Extreme Calvinism makes God the author of evil by suggesting that He predestines some to hell without ever offering them the opportunity to believe”​

Arminius and the Case for Free Will

Jacobus Arminius (1560–1609) opposed the rigid predestination of Calvinism, advocating that God’s grace enables but does not force salvation.

Geisler explains that, “Arminius rejected the idea that God unconditionally elects individuals to salvation without regard for their faith. Instead, he proposed that God’s election is based on His foreknowledge of who will believe”.

Arminius’s view, known as conditional election, maintains that:

• Salvation is available to all, but humans must choose to accept it.
• God foreknows who will accept His grace but does not force them.
• Grace is resistible—humans can reject God’s offer of salvation.
• Apostasy is possible—a believer can fall from grace through persistent unbelief.

Arminius’s theology led to the Five Articles of Remonstrance, which opposed Calvin’s TULIP. Later, his followers, known as Arminians, developed Wesleyanism, emphasizing God’s universal love and free human response.

Geisler defends moderate Arminianism, stating:

“God does not force salvation on anyone, yet He enables all to believe. This preserves both divine sovereignty and human responsibility”​.

In summary, the Augustine vs. Arminius debate shaped Christian views on free will, with Augustine emphasizing predestination and Arminius advocating human choice. Geisler finds a middle ground, arguing that God’s sovereignty and human free will are both affirmed in Scripture.

Biblical Support for Free Will

The Bible contains numerous verses that imply human choice in salvation and obedience. Some of the key passages supporting free will include:

Throughout Chosen But Free, Geisler presents overwhelming biblical evidence that human beings have the ability to make free choices, even after the Fall.

1. Old Testament Evidence

The Old Testament consistently presents human beings as responsible moral agents capable of making free choices:

Deuteronomy 30:19 calls to choose when it declares, “I have set before you life and death, blessings and curses. Now choose life, so that you and your children may live.”.

Geisler comments that, “The fact that God commands people to choose implies they have the ability to do so. God would not issue commands if humans were incapable of obeying”​.

God offers a choice through Joshua 24:15 when he says, “But if serving the LORD seems undesirable to you, then choose for yourselves this day whom you will serve.”

This passage demonstrates that people can freely decide whom to follow, contradicting deterministic views that claim God predetermines every human action.

2. New Testament Evidence

The New Testament repeatedly affirms human responsibility in salvation.

Matthew 23:37 – God’s Offer Can Be Rejected

“O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, you who kill the prophets and stone those sent to you, how often I have longed to gather your children together, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, but you were not willing.”

Geisler explains: “Jesus expresses His desire to save the people of Jerusalem, yet they resisted. This is clear evidence that God’s grace can be rejected”​.

This directly contradicts Calvinist irresistible grace, which claims that God’s elect cannot resist His call.

In the most cited verse of John 3:16, God offers salvation to all, yet humanity has the choice to refuse it. “For God so loved the world that He gave His one and only Son, that whoever believes in Him shall not perish but have eternal life.” (John 3:16).

In Geisler’s words: “The phrase ‘whoever believes’ means that salvation is conditional on faith, not an arbitrary predestined decree”​.

This aligns with Arminianism’s doctrine of prevenient grace, which states that God enables belief, but humans must choose to respond.

Acts 7:51 shows how holy spirit was rejected people, especially Jews. Here, Stephen rebukes the Jewish leaders for resisting God’s call, proving that divine grace is not irresistible. “You stiff-necked people! … You always resist the Holy Spirit.”

Yes, again, in verse 2 Peter 3:9 God desires all to be saved. Peter writes, “The Lord is not slow in keeping His promise, as some understand slowness. He is patient with you, not wanting anyone to perish, but everyone to come to repentance.”

Geisler emphasizes by saying that: “This verse directly contradicts the Calvinist doctrine of limited atonement, which claims Christ died only for the elect. If God desires ‘everyone’ to repent, salvation is universally available”​

Geisler argues that such passages directly contradict the notion of irresistible grace, since they suggest that God’s call can be resisted.

Philosophical and Theological Implications

From a philosophical standpoint, free will is essential to the moral responsibility of humans. If God predetermined every action, then human beings could not be held accountable for sin. This concern was even addressed by early theologians like John Chrysostom:

“All is in God’s power, but so that our free will is not lost…. It depends therefore on us and on Him. We must first choose the good, and then He adds what belongs to Him”.

Similarly, C.S. Lewis emphasized the necessity of free will in The Great Divorce:

“There are only two kinds of people in the end: those who say to God, ‘Thy will be done,’ and those to whom God says, ‘Thy will be done.’”

This perspective underscores God’s respect for human autonomy.

In Chosen But Free, Geisler presents a moderate Calvinist position, arguing that God is sovereign but not coercive. He warns against both hyper-Calvinism, which diminishes human choice, and extre Arminianism, which undermines divine sovereignty.

Ultimately, free will and divine sovereignty are not contradictions, but rather complementary truths. As Geisler concludes:

“We can be assured that (1) God is in control and that (2) we have been given the ability to choose. We are indeed chosen but free.”

This balanced approach preserves both the grandeur of God’s omnipotence and the dignity of human freedom.

Additionally,the discussion on theology and free will is far from settled. However, it is clear that Geisler’s approach seeks to reconcile divine sovereignty with human responsibility, preserving the mystery of faith while upholding the justice and love of God.

Whether one leans toward Calvinism, Arminianism, or Molinism, the dialogue on free will continues to shape theological thought, inviting deep reflection on the nature of faith, choice, and divine purpose.

Ethics morality and free will

The age-old debate on free will has fascinated philosophers, scientists, and ethicists alike. It lies at the heart of human responsibility, autonomy, and moral culpability.

Are we truly free to make choices, or are our decisions dictated by prior causes, genetics, or unconscious determinants? If determinism holds true, does moral responsibility collapse? These questions define the landscape of ethical philosophy and legal systems.

Two major perspectives emerge in this discussion: compatibilism, which argues that free will and determinism can coexist, and incompatibilism, which insists that true freedom is impossible in a deterministic world.

While American philosopher of pragmatism known for his contributions to the philosophy of history, the philosophy of education, political theory, and ethics, Sidney Hook²⁸ rigorously these contradicts views in his work, Sofia Bonicalzi and Patrick Haggard’s work¹¹ offers a neuroscientific and action-based perspective on human intentionality and moral agency.

To explore this topic, we will analyze how free will relates to ethics and morality, the impact of determinism on moral responsibility, and the implications of these philosophical standpoints for law, justice, and human dignity.

Free Will and the Foundations of Moral Responsibility

In moral philosophy, free will is often seen as a prerequisite for moral responsibility. A person is deemed responsible for their actions only if they could have acted otherwise. This idea, dating back to Aristotle and further refined in Kantian ethics, is a cornerstone of contemporary justice systems.

Sidney Hook, in his edited volume, explores how moral responsibility ties into free will:

“We are not impaled on the horns of any such dilemma: there are independent reasons, apart from the question of moral guilt, why a legal system should require a voluntary action as a condition of responsibility”.²⁸

This assertion suggests that voluntariness—rather than metaphysical freedom—is the key determinant of moral accountability. In other words, even if strict determinism governs human behavior, a person should still be judged based on whether they acted voluntarily.

The Evolution of Moral Theories Under Determinism

Some philosophers argue that moral responsibility does not require indeterministic free will. This view, often associated with soft determinism or compatibilism, suggests that human beings can still be held accountable within a causal framework.

John Stuart Mill, as cited in Hook’s book, believed that even though our desires and character are shaped by external forces, we can still cultivate moral virtues:

“By suitable training and efforts, my desire to change my character may in fact bring about the desired changes”²⁸ which implies that while our past influences our present, we are not completely shackled by it. Instead, we retain the ability to reflect, modify, and direct our own character.

By contrast, hard determinists (such as Baron d’Holbach and Schopenhauer) reject this flexibility, arguing that free will is illusory. According to them, all actions, including seemingly “free” choices, are governed by prior causes:

“Man, who thinks himself free, is a fly who imagines he has power to move the universe, while he is himself unknowingly carried along by it”.²⁸

If this extreme deterministic view holds true, traditional notions of moral responsibility would need to be restructured.

The Shift from “Freedom From” to “Freedom To”

Sofia Bonicalzi and Patrick Haggard introduce a fascinating conceptual shift: instead of seeing freedom merely as the absence of external constraints (Freedom From), they argue that true agency requires the ability to act with intentionality (Freedom To).

They invoke Isaiah Berlin’s classic distinction:

– Negative freedom (Freedom From): The absence of external interference.

– Positive freedom (Freedom To): The active capacity to shape one’s own destiny.

This has profound ethical implications. If true freedom is not just about escaping coercion but about the ability to act with purpose and self-awareness, then even a deterministic world could allow for moral responsibility—provided that individuals have sufficient self-control and autonomy.

Neuroscience, Action Control, and Ethics

Bonicalzi and Haggard argue that modern cognitive science supports a gradualist model of agency, where actions exist on a spectrum of intentionality. In their words:

“We defend a graded notion of intentional behavior, which revolves around the following key features: autonomy, flexibility in the integration of causal vectors, and control”.¹¹

This aligns with compatibilist ethics, where control over one’s actions (rather than metaphysical free will) is the main requirement for moral responsibility.

However, neuroscience also challenges our assumptions about free will. Studies on intentional binding suggest that our subjective feeling of control may be a post hoc illusion, rather than the actual driver of action. This echoes Daniel Wegner’s controversial claim:

“We infer rather than perceive the moment we decided to act”.¹¹

If our sense of agency[2] is partially illusory, this raises troubling questions about ethical responsibility.

Legal and Ethical Consequences of Determinism

The justice system assumes that individuals choose to commit crimes and can be held morally and legally responsible. Yet, if determinism is true, can we still justify punishment?

Sidney Hook critiques this dilemma:

“It is unfair and unjust to punish those who have not ‘voluntarily’ broken the law”.²⁸

Some scholars argue for a rehabilitative approach rather than retribution. If people act under the influence of biological predispositions, psychological traumas, or social conditions, shouldn’t justice focus on reform rather than punishment?

The Pragmatic Defense of Responsibility

Despite deterministic arguments, many philosophers maintain that abandoning moral responsibility leads to chaos. As Hook asserts: “Sane and rational human beings… still stubbornly insist on deciding, choosing, and acting as though they were autonomous”.²⁸

This pragmatic view suggests that, even if free will is an illusion, it is a necessary one—essential for sustaining moral values, social order, and human dignity.

However, from ancient philosophy to modern neuroscience, the question of free will remains deeply intertwined with ethics, morality, and justice. While determinism poses real challenges, perspectives like compatibilism and gradualist agency models offer ways to preserve moral accountability without requiring absolute freedom.

Perhaps the most human approach to this debate is not to seek a rigid answer, but to recognize that our sense of agency, our capacity for moral growth, and our need for justice remain deeply significant—regardless of whether free will is absolute or constrained.

As Berlin, Hook, and Bonicalzi remind us, freedom is not just about escaping constraints, but about shaping our own paths in a meaningful way.

Neuroscience and Free will

A.Neuroscientific Perspectives

The question of free will has perplexed philosophers, theologians, and scientists for centuries. Traditionally framed as a metaphysical problem, free will’s existence and nature remain contentious in both academic and public discourse.

However, contemporary neuroscience offers a fresh lens through which to examine the mechanisms that underlie volition, decision-making, and the subjective experience of agency.¹⁷

Neuroscience has revealed intricate processes in the brain that contribute to the feeling of intentionality, yet these findings raise profound questions: Are we truly the authors of our decisions, or are these merely epiphenomenal perceptions generated by unconscious neural processes? Does the discovery of pre-conscious neural activity preceding conscious intention undermine free will, or does it redefine it? These are the inquiries this section seeks to explore, grounded in rigorous neuroscientific research.

I. The Neural Basis of Volition: The Mechanisms of Free will

Understanding free will requires us to examine how volitional actions originate in the brain.

Historically, voluntary actions have been distinguished from reflexive or externally driven actions, emphasizing an element of endogenous decision-making.

Patrick Haggard ²² outlines the critical neural circuits involved in voluntary action, identifying the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), anterior prefrontal cortex, and parietal cortex as essential components. These regions coordinate the initiation of voluntary movements, encode intentions before they manifest in behavior, and generate the conscious experience of willing an action.

The prefrontal cortex plays a significant role in executive control, influencing decision-making processes that align with long-term goals rather than immediate stimuli. This highlights a crucial aspect of free will: the ability to act based on deliberation rather than mere impulse.²²

Benjamin Libet’s (2004)³⁵ seminal work in Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness provided one of the most controversial challenges to traditional notions of free will.

His studies demonstrated that the readiness potential (RP)—a slow buildup of neural activity in the supplementary motor area—precedes the subjective feeling of intention by approximately 350 milliseconds. This suggests that unconscious neural processes initiate actions before we consciously decide to perform them.

However, Libet proposed a “veto” mechanism, arguing that while the initiation of actions might be unconscious, conscious awareness retains the ability to override them in the final milliseconds before execution. This concept of “free won’t” (as in Free Will or Free Won’t?) preserves a limited form of volition, distinguishing it from pure determinism.³⁵

(For example, I decide to turn on a light, and act on that intention. But I may not have the control I imagine. My decision to turn on the light happens prior to my consciousness of the decision.  However, my ability to reverse that decision is conscious. I begin to reach for the light switch and … change my mind. However, my ability to reverse that decision is conscious. I begin to reach for the light switch and … change my mind.  The capacity to withhold an action that we have prepared but reconsidered is an important distinction between intelligent and impulsive behavior.

Before I send that text, before I click that post. Before I shout a mean word. There is the possibility of “won’t.”)

II. The Role of Unconscious Processing in Decision-Making

Recent neuroscientific studies further challenge the traditional understanding of free will, demonstrating that unconscious processes can predict decisions well before conscious awareness.

A groundbreaking study by Chun Siong Soon et al.⁵⁵ found that brain activity in the prefrontal and parietal cortex could predict a person’s choice up to 10 seconds before conscious awareness. This extended time frame suggests that the feeling of making a decision might be a post hoc (after the event) rationalization rather than a causal factor.

The study’s methodology involved participants making a binary choice (e.g., pressing a left or right button) while their brain activity was monitored via functional MRI (fMRI). The researchers found that patterns of neural activity in the frontopolar cortex and precuneus contained information about the decision long before participants became aware of it.⁵⁵

This challenges the traditional notion that consciousness plays a fundamental role in decision-making.

Neural research further supports these findings, showing that even when individuals believe they are making conscious decisions, their brain activity often reveals the choice had been determined prior to conscious awareness.¹³

Joaquín Fuster (2013) posits that the brain operates as a predictive machine, continually generating models of future outcomes based on past experiences. Rather than decisions being consciously willed in the moment, they emerge as the result of prior learning and probabilistic estimations.

This aligns with the concept of deterministic prediction, where the brain, based on prior information, “decides” before we are aware of our own decision. This does not necessarily negate free will but reframes it as a complex interplay between unconscious computations and conscious reflection.¹⁴

III. Neuroscience vs. Phenomenology

Despite compelling evidence suggesting that many decisions originate unconsciously, humans still experience a strong sense of agency. This paradox demands exploration.

Neuroscientific experiments have demonstrated that intentional actions and their consequences are perceived as temporally compressed, a phenomenon known as intentional binding.¹² This effect strengthens the subjective experience of causing an event, reinforcing the belief in free will.

Haggard’s studies²² show that stimulation of the supplementary motor area (SMA) can evoke an illusory sense of volition, leading participants to believe they intentionally moved when the movement was externally induced. This suggests that agency is not a direct perception of volition but a cognitive construct, potentially vulnerable to manipulation.

Neuroscientific studies suggest that decision-making following unfair treatment activates the right dorsal anterior insula, implicating emotional and social norm violations in our perception of free will.⁶³

IV. Reconciling Neuroscience and Free will

While neuroscience presents compelling challenges to traditional notions of free will, a middle ground can be found in compatibilism—the view that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive.

Peter Ulric Tse (2013) proposes that free will exists in the brain’s ability to set criteria for future neuronal firing patterns. This model suggests that while individual decisions may be constrained by prior conditions, the brain actively shapes and reconfigures decision-making criteria, allowing for a meaningful degree of autonomy.

Neuroscience challenges traditional notions of free will, demonstrating that unconscious processes precede conscious decisions. However, this does not entirely negate autonomy. Instead, it suggests a reinterpretation of free will—one where consciousness functions as a higher-order regulator, guiding and shaping decisions within a structured yet adaptable system.

B. Consciousness and Cognitive Neuroscience

Understanding consciousness through cognitive neuroscience (a subfield of neuroscience that studies the biological processes that underlie human cognition, especially in regards to the relation between brain structures, activity, and cognitive functions) provides insights into self-awareness, perception, and decision-making, ultimately informing the debate on free will. Various theories propose explanations, from the ego tunnel model (Metzinger, 2009)⁴⁴¹ to the attention schema theory (Graziano, 2013)¹⁹ and the affective consciousness perspective (Damasio, 1999)⁷. We are now going to explore these perspectives in detail, integrating evidence from the leading literature on the subject.

Theories of Consciousness

Thomas Metzinger in The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self argues that the self is not an independent entity but a construct—a virtual reality model created by the brain. He posits:

“There is no such thing as a self. Contrary to what most people believe, nobody has ever been or had a self. The Ego Tunnel is the complex model of reality our brain generates.”⁴⁴

This idea aligns with the predictive coding framework in neuroscience, which suggests that the brain continuously generates hypotheses about the world based on sensory input and internal models. Metzinger’s work challenges the traditional notion of free will, arguing that decision-making emerges from unconscious processes rather than an autonomous self.

Graziano (2013) in Consciousness and the Social Brain presents the attention schema theory (AST), which describes consciousness as an internal model used by the brain to monitor and control attention. He explains:

“Consciousness is a simplified, useful model of one’s own attention processes. It is constructed by the same mechanisms that model the attention of others, explaining why we attribute consciousness to other beings as well.”¹⁹

This perspective provides a neurological basis for social cognition and theory of mind, explaining how humans attribute consciousness to others and to themselves. The AST suggests that free will may not be absolute but rather a perception generated by the attention schema.

Jesse Prinz in The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience asserts that consciousness arises from attentional mechanisms that amplify sensory information. He states:

“Without attention, there is no consciousness. Conscious perception is the result of neural processes that enhance certain sensory signals while suppressing others.”⁵⁰

His argument supports a bottom-up view of consciousness, suggesting that while higher-order thoughts may influence perception, they are not necessary for conscious experience itself. This challenges libertarian free will by suggesting that our choices are shaped by attentional biases rather than an independent self.

Cognitive Neuroscience and Free will

Antonio Damasio (1999)⁷ in The Feeling of What Happens argues that emotions and bodily states play a critical role in decision-making and consciousness. His somatic marker hypothesis posits that:

“Feelings act as markers that influence decision-making, often at an unconscious level, guiding rational thought through emotional input”.⁷

This has profound implications for free will, as it suggests that decisions are not purely rational or autonomous but heavily influenced by pre-conscious emotional states.

Laureys in The Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and Neuropathology provides insights into how consciousness is altered in conditions such as coma, vegetative states, and locked-in syndrome. He highlights:

“Consciousness is not a binary phenomenon but a continuum, fluctuating between wakefulness, awareness, and deep unconsciousness.”³⁴

This challenges traditional notions of free will, as patients with disorders of consciousness demonstrate varying levels of cognitive awareness that may be dissociated from their ability to act on decisions.

Implications for Free will

The intersection of consciousness and decision-making in cognitive neuroscience challenges the classical notion of free will. Research indicates:

– Metzinger’s ego tunnel⁴⁴ suggests that the self is an illusion, making free will a construct rather than an independent force.

– Graziano’s AST¹⁹ implies that free will is a consequence of an evolved attention schema rather than an inherent property of cognition.

– Prinz’s attentional model⁵⁰ asserts that consciousness is an emergent property of selective attention, limiting the autonomy of choice.

– Damasio’s affective model⁷ integrates bodily signals into decision-making, reducing the role of abstract rational agency.

– Laureys’ research on disorders of consciousness³⁴ questions the very nature of awareness and volition in individuals with brain injuries.

The convergence of these perspectives suggests that free will, as traditionally conceived, may not be as robust as it appears.

Rather than being an absolute property of human cognition, it emerges as an epiphenomenon of attention, self-modeling, and emotional processing. Future research must continue to explore how conscious experience and volitional control interact within the neurobiological constraints of the brain.

Psychology on Free Will

Free will has been a subject of intense debate across philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. It raises fundamental questions about human agency, decision-making, and the extent to which individuals control their actions.

The psychological perspective on free will, as discussed in various works such as Are We Free? Psychology and Free will (Baer, Kaufman, & Baumeister, 2008)², Free will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? (Baumeister, Mele, & Vohs, 2010)⁴, and Do Conscious Thoughts Cause Behavior? (Baumeister, Masicampo, & Vohs, 2011), offers insights into the mechanisms through which people experience choice, agency, and volition.

Are We Free?

The perception of free will is deeply ingrained in human consciousness. Baer, Kaufman, and Baumeister (2008)² acknowledge that while individuals act as if they possess free will, psychologists have often hesitated to engage with the topic scientifically. The book examines various perspectives, arguing that free will, as commonly understood, may not be an absolute phenomenon but rather a psychological construct shaped by cognitive processes and external constraints.

Psychologists such as David G. Myers (2008) propose a nuanced view, suggesting that determinism and free will are not mutually exclusive. Myers argues, “Determinism encourages us to action, not resignation, and does not compel people to act against their will”.²

This suggests that while external and internal influences shape human behavior, individuals still perceive and exercise autonomy within these constraints.

Albert Bandura (2008) takes an agentic perspective, arguing that self-regulatory processes, such as beliefs, goals, and expectations, play a crucial role in volitional behavior. Bandura states, “Nonagentic theories of behavior dismiss constructs like moral agency and proactive control, but these are essential for understanding free choices”.² This perspective aligns with social cognitive theory, which posits that humans actively shape their behavior rather than being passive recipients of environmental stimuli.

Consciousness and Free will

Baumeister, Mele, and Vohs (2010)⁴ explore the interplay between consciousness and free will.

One major argument is that consciousness serves an essential function in decision-making, particularly in complex and socially embedded behaviors. Mele (2010)⁴ criticizes deterministic arguments that claim conscious decisions are mere post hoc rationalizations of unconscious processes, noting that “The layperson’s belief in free will is closer to the legal concept of agency—namely, that people can choose differently under different conditions”.⁴

Similarly, in Do Conscious Thoughts Cause Behavior?³, Baumeister et al. review extensive research on conscious causation, suggesting that while unconscious processes play a substantial role, consciousness is crucial for self-reflection, moral reasoning, and planning.

They argue that “Conscious thought does not simply mirror unconscious processes; it is involved in shaping future actions, inhibiting impulsive responses, and engaging in social coordination”.³This aligns with dual-process theories, which propose that human cognition operates on both automatic and controlled levels.

Steven Pinker, in How the Mind Works (1997), examines the computational nature of the mind and its implications for free will. He suggests that the brain operates through complex algorithms that simulate decision-making processes. Pinker states, “Our sense of agency is a byproduct of neural computations that evaluate potential courses of action based on expected outcomes”.⁴⁹

This view aligns with compatibilist perspectives, which argue that free will can exist even in a deterministic framework, as long as individuals are capable of rational deliberation.

The Failure to Comprehend Determinism

Nadelhoffer, Murray, and Murray investigate the intuitive resistance to determinism, arguing that many people struggle to reconcile deterministic explanations with their subjective experience of choice. They note that “people’s rejection of determinism often stems from a misunderstanding of what determinism entails rather than a deep philosophical commitment to libertarian free will”.⁴⁷

This finding suggests that psychological biases may contribute to the widespread belief in free will, even among those who accept deterministic principles in other domains.

One of the most critical implications of free will research lies in moral responsibility. If free will is an illusion, does that absolve individuals of responsibility for their actions?

Baumeister argues that the belief in free will plays a crucial role in social order and ethical behavior. Studies indicate that when people are primed to disbelieve in free will, they are more likely to engage in unethical behavior, such as cheating and aggression.² This suggests that whether or not free will objectively exists, the belief in it has significant psychological and societal benefits.

The psychological study of free will reveals a complex interplay between conscious deliberation, unconscious processes, and social influences. While determinism may pose challenges to traditional notions of free will, research suggests that individuals experience a functional sense of agency that guides behavior. Whether free will is an absolute phenomenon or a cognitive illusion, its role in human thought, morality, and society remains profound.

Future research must continue to explore how cognitive mechanisms and social factors shape our experience of choice and responsibility.

Determinism and the Scientific Challenge to Free Will

The age-old debate over free will and determinism has taken on new dimensions in the light of contemporary scientific discoveries.

Determinism suggests that all events, including human actions, are determined by preceding causes. This notion directly challenges the traditional belief in free will, which asserts that individuals have the capacity to make choices independent of prior conditions. Scientific advancements, particularly in neuroscience, psychology, and physics, have provided compelling evidence that our choices may be the product of biological and environmental factors rather than autonomous agency.

This part explores this debate through the lens of six seminal works: Beyond Freedom and Dignity by B.F. Skinner, Biology of Freedom by Francois Ansermet and Pierre Magistretti, Determined: A Science of Life Without Free will by Robert M. Sapolsky, Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? by Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown, The Illusion of Conscious Will by Daniel M. Wegner, and Neuroscientific Challenges to Free will and Responsibility by Adina Roskies.

Determinism in Behaviorism and Neuroscience

B.F. Skinner’s Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971) presents a radical behaviorist view, asserting that free will is an illusion and that human behavior is entirely shaped by environmental influences and genetic predisposition.

Skinner states, “The autonomous man is a device used to explain what we cannot explain in any other way. He has been constructed from our ignorance”. He emphasizes operant conditioning, where actions are reinforced or discouraged through external stimuli. This deterministic model suggests that human agency is not an independent force but rather a product of conditioning, challenging the traditional notion of self-determined choice.

Neuroscience strengthens this argument. In The Illusion of Conscious Will, Wegner (2002)⁶¹ suggests that our perception of volition is a post hoc construction rather than an actual cause of behavior. He notes, “The experience of will arises from processes that are psychologically and anatomically distinct from the processes whereby mind creates action”.⁶¹

This aligns with findings in cognitive neuroscience that reveal decisions being initiated in the brain before conscious awareness of making a choice.

Robert Sapolsky presents one of the most comprehensive scientific rejections of free will.

He argues that every decision and action is an inevitable consequence of a cascade of prior biological and environmental events. “Show me a neuron whose generation of behavior is independent of the sum of its biological past, and for the purposes of this book, you’ve demonstrated free will”.⁵² His argument is rooted in the idea that factors such as genetics, hormonal activity, stress, and past experiences interact in complex but deterministic ways, shaping thoughts and behaviors in ways that leave no room for independent agency.

This perspective aligns with modern neuroscience, which increasingly suggests that human decision-making is a product of mechanistic processes rather than self-directed choice.

Adina Roskies’ Neuroscientific Challenges to Free will and Responsibility (2006) highlights the growing concern that neuroscience may undermine our concepts of moral responsibility. However, she argues that while neuroscience offers a mechanistic view of behavior, it does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of responsibility. “Even if people misconstrue neuroscientific results as relevant to our notion of freedom, our judgments of moral responsibility will remain largely unaffected”.⁵¹

This suggests that societal and legal notions of accountability might persist even in the face of deterministic explanations.

Reconciling Determinism with Moral Responsibility

Murphy and Brown (2007)⁴⁶ propose a nuanced approach that challenges strict reductionism, the “view that asserts that entities of a given kind are identical to, or are collections or combinations of, entities of another kind or that expressions denoting such entities are definable in terms of expressions denoting other entities.”

They argue that while neural mechanisms influence behavior, higher-order cognitive functions allow for self-regulation. “The critical issue in the debate is one’s ability, as a whole person, to exercise downward control over one’s own behavior, cognition, and neural processes”.⁴⁶ This supports a compatibilist view, suggesting that moral responsibility does not necessarily require absolute free will but rather the ability to act in accordance with internalized values and reasons.

Similarly, Ansermet and Magistretti in Biology of Freedom (2007) explore neural plasticity as a potential basis for a form of constrained agency. They argue that while our choices are influenced by past experiences, the brain’s ability to reorganize and adapt provides a space for self-reflection and change. “Neural plasticity opens a window for a form of freedom that is shaped by, yet not entirely determined by, biological history” .¹

The Illusion of Conscious Choice

Wegner’s research illustrates how human beings often mistake correlation for causation when it comes to their own actions. His experiments demonstrate that individuals can be led to believe they willed an action that was actually controlled externally, suggesting that conscious intention may not be the true initiator of behavior.

This illusion of conscious will emerges from the brain’s tendency to construct a coherent narrative about past events, reinforcing the belief in personal agency. Wegner explains, “The illusion of will is so compelling that it can prompt the belief that acts were intended when they could not have been” .⁶¹ Through a series of studies, he shows how delayed motor actions and priming effects can create a false sense of volition, making individuals confident that they consciously initiated actions they did not actually control. This deeply challenges the concept of libertarian free will, which posits that humans have genuine alternative possibilities in their decision-making.

If our experiences of choice are merely the result of neural and cognitive processes beyond conscious control, then the foundation of personal agency becomes a compelling yet deceptive construct.

Is Free Will Salvageable?

The scientific challenge to free will is formidable. The convergence of evidence from behavioral psychology, neuroscience, and physics suggests that human actions are deeply embedded in causal chains that preclude absolute autonomy. However, perspectives from Murphy and Brown, as well as Ansermet and Magistretti, indicate that a nuanced form of agency might still exist within deterministic frameworks.

While traditional notions of libertarian free will may not be tenable, the capacity for reflection, adaptation, and moral responsibility might persist within a deterministic universe.

Ultimately, whether we choose to fully accept determinism or adopt a modified compatibilist view, the challenge remains: how do we reconcile these scientific insights with our deeply ingrained intuitions about free will and moral responsibility?

The debate is far from settled, but what remains clear is that understanding human behavior through the lens of science does not diminish its complexity—it enriches our appreciation of it.

Legal and Ethical Implications of Free Will

The interplay between free will, law, and ethics has long been a subject of intense debate in philosophy and jurisprudence. The advent of neuroscience has added a new dimension to this discussion, raising fundamental questions about moral responsibility, legal accountability, and ethical fairness.

The Legal Foundations of Free Will and Responsibility

The legal system has historically hinged on the assumption that individuals possess free will, which enables them to make rational choices. This premise underlies the doctrine of mens rea (guilty mind), a fundamental requirement in criminal law. “In most criminal cases, a successful conviction requires the prosecution to establish not only that the defendant engaged in proscribed behavior, but also that the misdeed in question was the product of mens rea, a ‘guilty mind’” .²⁰

This doctrine implies that the law does not merely punish actions but evaluates the mental states behind them.

However, the field of neuroscience challenges this notion by demonstrating that human behavior is profoundly influenced by neurological processes. If actions are determined by brain mechanisms beyond conscious control, the traditional framework of culpability may require reconsideration.

Cognitive neuroscience suggests that decision-making is governed by physical processes in the brain, many of which operate unconsciously. This view aligns with determinism—the idea that all events, including human actions, are causally determined by prior states of affairs. Greene and Cohen²⁰ argue that neuroscience “will probably have a transformative effect on the law, despite the fact that existing legal doctrine can, in principle, accommodate whatever neuroscience will tell us” (p. 1775). They propose that as scientific understanding of the brain deepens, societal moral intuitions about responsibility will shift, influencing legal doctrines.

One of the most striking examples of this shift comes from studies on brain abnormalities in criminals. Cases where tumors or lesions have led to violent behavior illustrate how certain neurological conditions can impair decision-making. Morse acknowledges that such findings necessitate legal adaptations but insists that they do not invalidate the principle of legal responsibility: “The law assumes that people have a general capacity for rational choice… neuroscience does nothing to undermine this assumption”.⁴⁵ He contends that while neuroscience can refine our understanding of rationality, it does not eliminate the need for accountability.

The Debate: Compatibilism vs. Incompatibilism in Law

The legal system generally operates on a compatibilist view of free will, which holds that determinism and moral responsibility can coexist. In contrast, hard determinists argue that if all actions are determined by brain mechanisms, then moral responsibility is an illusion. Greene and Cohen²⁰ suggest that “the law’s intuitive support is ultimately grounded in a metaphysically overambitious, libertarian notion of free will that is threatened by determinism”. They predict that as neuroscience progresses, retributive justice—punishment based on desert—will decline in favor of a consequentialist approach, which justifies punishment based on future societal benefits rather than past transgressions.

Morse however, criticizes this perspective, asserting that legal responsibility should be assessed based on the capacity for rational decision-making, not metaphysical debates on free will. He argues that “questions about who is or is not responsible in the eyes of the law have and will continue to turn on questions about rationality”.⁴⁵ This means that as long as individuals can engage in rational deliberation, they can be held legally accountable.

One of the core ethical issues surrounding free will is whether individuals truly deserve punishment. If actions are dictated by brain states, the justification for retributive justice becomes tenuous. Greene and Cohen (2004)²⁰ illustrate this dilemma with the hypothetical case of “Mr. Puppet,” a person entirely designed by scientists to commit crimes. They argue that “given the fact that forces beyond his control played a dominant role in causing him to commit these crimes, it is hard to think of him as anything more than a pawn”.

This scenario challenges traditional notions of moral desert and highlights the ethical complexities of punishment.

A shift away from retributivism would mean reevaluating sentencing policies, especially for individuals with neurological impairments. Morse⁴⁵ acknowledges that neuroscience can inform more humane sentencing but warns against its misuse in absolving individuals of responsibility. He states, “The fundamental psycholegal error is to believe that causation, especially abnormal causation, is per se an excusing condition”.

In other words, the fact that behavior has a neurological basis does not necessarily negate personal responsibility.

The Future of Law and Free Will

As neuroscience continues to advance, its impact on the legal system will likely intensify. While Greene and Cohen²⁰ foresee a radical transformation, Morse⁴⁵ advocates for a more measured integration of scientific findings into legal doctrine. The key question is whether society will move toward a more rehabilitative and preventive model of justice or retain traditional notions of punishment based on moral desert.

One potential compromise is a tiered approach to legal responsibility that incorporates neuroscientific insights without completely discarding free will. For instance, sentencing reforms could account for degrees of neurobiological impairment, ensuring that punishment aligns with an individual’s actual capacity for rational choice. Such reforms could strike a balance between fairness and social protection.

The debate over free will in law and ethics is far from settled. While neuroscience challenges traditional assumptions about agency, it does not necessarily render legal responsibility obsolete. Instead, it calls for a nuanced reevaluation of how we assign blame and administer justice. As Greene and Cohen (2004)²⁰ predict, the legal landscape may eventually shift from a retributive framework to a consequentialist one, prioritizing rehabilitation over punishment.

However, as Morse⁴⁵ contends, the law must maintain a pragmatic foundation, ensuring that justice remains functional and applicable.

Ultimately, the intersection of neuroscience, free will, and the law forces us to confront profound ethical questions about human agency, fairness, and the very nature of justice. The answers we choose will shape the future of legal and moral responsibility in a world increasingly illuminated by science.

Free Will and Social Dynamics

Free will is often perceived as the ultimate expression of human agency—the ability to make choices independent of external influences. Yet, our decisions are inextricably linked to the social structures surrounding us.

In The Human Network: How Your Social Position Determines Your Power, Beliefs, and Behaviors, Matthew O. Jackson elucidates how networks influence our choices, behaviors, and ultimately, our perceived autonomy. While we may believe we act independently, our social ties exert a profound force, subtly guiding our decisions in ways we often fail to recognize.

This interplay between individual agency and social structure forms the crux of the debate on free will in the context of social dynamics.

At first glance, free will suggests that individuals make choices based on rational thought, desires, and personal experiences. However, Jackson highlights that these choices are deeply embedded in social networks. The concept of homophily, or the tendency to associate with similar others, ensures that our beliefs and decisions are not isolated but rather products of our social environment (Jackson, 2019).

Studies have shown that our decisions—ranging from whom we befriend to whether we pursue higher education—are significantly influenced by our network structures.

For instance, Jackson provides compelling evidence of cascading dropout decisions in high schools, where students often decide to drop out if their friends do the same (Jackson, 2019). This phenomenon suggests that even critical life decisions are susceptible to social contagion. If dropping out is perceived as a norm within one’s social circle, resisting that trend becomes increasingly difficult. In such a case, is the decision truly independent, or is it a response to social pressures?

The Social Tug-of-War: Free Will vs. Social Influence

Networks shape not only our behaviors but also our perspectives. Jackson explores the concept of social reinforcement, where repeated exposure to certain ideas solidifies them as personal beliefs (Jackson, 2019). This is particularly evident in political ideologies, religious beliefs, and cultural norms.

The strength of network influence can be compared to a tug-of-war—individuals may attempt to exercise free will, but the overwhelming pull of their social environment often prevails.

Take, for example, the role of social networks in job acquisition. Research suggests that nearly 50% of jobs are secured through personal connections rather than direct applications (Jackson, 2019). This underscores the significant role of network structures in shaping one’s professional trajectory. If an individual is embedded in a network with limited job opportunities, their economic mobility is constrained—not by a lack of ambition but by the structure of their connections.

Consequently, what appears as personal failure may, in reality, be a function of network limitations rather than individual shortcomings.

One of the paradoxes Jackson discusses is the wisdom and folly of the crowd—the idea that collective intelligence can both empower and restrict free will (Jackson, 2019)).

On the one hand, collective decision-making can yield remarkable insights, such as the accurate prediction of market trends or scientific advancements. On the other hand, the same mechanisms can lead to groupthink, wherein individuals conform to the majority view despite personal reservations.

A classic example of this is financial market bubbles, where herd mentality leads to irrational investment behaviors. The 2008 financial crisis exemplifies how collective decision-making can exacerbate systemic failures. Investors followed the prevailing trend, often ignoring warning signs, because the dominant network narrative assured them that the market would continue to rise.

This raises a pertinent question: If most decisions are shaped by network dynamics, how much control does an individual truly have?

The Role of Structural Inequality in Decision-Making

Jackson’s research also reveals how social immobility and inequality limit personal agency. Networks can act as firewalls, keeping individuals in disadvantaged positions by restricting their access to resources and opportunities.²⁹ He highlights how deeply entrenched forces—such as racial, income, and educational homophily—contribute to systemic inequality.

For instance, individuals born into affluent social circles are more likely to access elite education, mentorship, and lucrative job opportunities. In contrast, those born into lower-income networks may find it significantly harder to break out of financial instability. Despite possessing talent and determination, their social position dictates the probability of success. This reality challenges the notion of meritocracy and free will, revealing that many decisions are predetermined by one’s starting position in the social hierarchy.

Digital Networks and the Algorithmic Influence on Free Will

In the age of social media, our networks have expanded beyond physical proximity to include digital interactions. Jackson touches upon the accelerated spread of information in the digital era, noting that while technology enables unprecedented connectivity, it also amplifies echo chambers and polarization.²⁹ Algorithms now play an active role in shaping our choices—curating news, suggesting friendships, and reinforcing pre-existing biases.

A striking example is the phenomenon of algorithmic filtering, where platforms like Facebook and YouTube tailor content based on user preferences. While this creates a personalized experience, it also restricts exposure to diverse perspectives, further reinforcing homophily. Consequently, our digital behaviors are not purely autonomous; they are subtly guided by an invisible network of algorithms designed to maximize engagement rather than encourage independent thought.

If networks exert such a profound influence on decision-making, does true free will exist? Jackson offers a nuanced perspective—while social structures shape our behaviors, awareness of these influences can help individuals counteract them.²⁹ He suggests that increasing network diversity can expand opportunities and broaden perspectives, thereby enhancing personal agency.

One potential remedy is fostering bridging ties—connections that span across different social groups. Research has shown that individuals with diverse social networks are more innovative, adaptable, and economically successful.²⁹ By actively seeking interactions outside of one’s immediate circle, individuals can mitigate the limitations imposed by network homogeneity.

Moreover, understanding the mechanics of social influence allows for greater autonomy in decision-making. If individuals recognize how networks shape their beliefs, they can engage in more critical thinking, questioning dominant narratives rather than passively accepting them.

Free will and social dynamics exist in a delicate balance—while we may feel autonomous in our choices, our decisions are often preordained by the networks we inhabit. The Human Network sheds light on the hidden forces that guide our behaviors, revealing that much of what we consider independent action is, in reality, a product of social influence.

However, by becoming aware of these dynamics, individuals can take deliberate steps to expand their agency—questioning biases, diversifying networks, and resisting the gravitational pull of social conformity. In an interconnected world, true freedom lies not in absolute independence but in the conscious navigation of social forces.

Evolutionary Perspectives on Free Will

The concept of free will has long been debated by philosophers, scientists, and theologians alike. From an evolutionary standpoint, understanding free will requires a deep exploration of the biological, cognitive, and neurological mechanisms that may have shaped our sense of agency.

Three seminal works of John C. Eccles¹⁰, Michael C. Corballis⁶ and Iain McGilchrist⁴⁰—provide valuable insights into the evolutionary emergence of free will.

By analyzing these perspectives, we can better grasp how the evolution of the brain, cognition, and culture has influenced our understanding of choice and agency.

The Evolutionary Basis of Free will

Nobel Prize winner in Physiology, 1963, Australian neurophysiologist and philosopher John C. Eccles argues¹⁰ that the evolution of the human brain allowed for the emergence of self-consciousness and volitional control over behavior. He asserts that human free will is not merely an illusion but rather a fundamental characteristic of our species. Eccles writes:

“When discussing free will, Searle⁵³ defines it as ‘the belief that we could have done things differently from the way we did in fact do them. And this belief in turn connects with beliefs about moral responsibility and our nature as persons.’”¹⁰

Eccles contends that voluntary movements, as observed in the activity of the Supplementary Motor Area (SMA), demonstrate a clear neural basis for intentional action. He suggests that the human self acts upon the physical brain in a manner analogous to quantum probability fields, allowing for non-deterministic decision-making.¹⁰

This perspective challenges strict materialistic determinism, proposing instead that free will arises from an interactionist dualist framework.

Recursion and the Development of Free will

Michael C. Corballis’ The Recursive Mind provides another evolutionary perspective, emphasizing that recursion—the ability to embed thoughts within thoughts—played a key role in the emergence of free will. He states:

“The ability to take advantage of others through recursive thinking has been termed Machiavellian intelligence, whereby we use social strategies not merely to cooperate with our fellows, but also to outwit and deceive them.”⁶

This recursive ability, Corballis argues, underlies theory of mind, self-reflection, and the capacity for moral reasoning—all essential components of what we perceive as free will. In early human societies, the capacity to model the thoughts and intentions of others provided an evolutionary advantage, enabling strategic decision-making beyond simple stimulus-response mechanisms.

Additionally, Corballis suggests that recursion in language allowed for greater flexibility in decision-making and planning, supporting the idea that free will evolved as a cognitive byproduct of increasingly complex neural processes.⁶

The Divided Brain and the Illusion of Free will

Iain McGilchrist, in The Master and His Emissary, takes a neurobiological approach to understanding free will by examining hemispheric differences in brain function. He argues that the right hemisphere is associated with holistic, open-ended, and context-sensitive decision-making, whereas the left hemisphere is more rigid and deterministic. McGilchrist writes:

“The left hemisphere’s approach to reality is fragmented and mechanistic, whereas the right hemisphere perceives things as part of a larger whole. This has profound implications for our understanding of agency and free will.”⁴⁰

According to McGilchrist, modern society’s overreliance on left-hemisphere processing has led to an exaggerated sense of control, reinforcing an illusion of autonomy. He argues that true free will requires an integration of both hemispheres, allowing for flexible decision-making that incorporates emotion, intuition, and contextual awareness.⁴⁰

The Evolution of Moral Responsibility

From an evolutionary standpoint, free will is deeply tied to moral responsibility, which has significant survival advantages. Eccles (1989)¹⁰ suggests that the ability to evaluate moral consequences before acting is uniquely human:

“Moral responsibility is not for non-human animals. Although they carry out voluntary movements, they do not ‘Will’ them, which means to evaluate their consequences for good or ill before acting.”¹⁰

Similarly, Corballis⁶ points out that theory of mind allows individuals to predict how their actions will be perceived by others, reinforcing social cohesion through cooperation and trust. The ability to distinguish between right and wrong, therefore, is an adaptive trait that evolved to strengthen group survival.

Does Evolution Support or Refute Free Will?

The three perspectives examined here present different but complementary views on the evolution of free will:

– Eccles’ model¹⁰ supports a non-deterministic, quantum-influenced concept of free will.

– Corballis emphasizes recursion⁶, arguing that complex cognition naturally led to the emergence of autonomous decision-making.

– McGilchrist warns of an illusion⁴⁰, suggesting that our conscious sense of agency may be a product of left-hemisphere dominance.

While strict biological determinism suggests that all actions are the product of neural and environmental causality, the recursive, self-reflective, and morally evaluative nature of the human mind implies that free will—at least in some form—exists as a functional and meaningful evolutionary adaptation.

Synthesis of Perspectives

The evolution of free will is a multifaceted phenomenon. Eccles¹⁰ provides a biological argument rooted in neuroscience and quantum mechanics, Corballis highlights⁶ the cognitive architecture that enables choice, and McGilchrist presents⁴⁰ a neuropsychological critique of our perceived autonomy. Taken together, these perspectives suggest that free will is neither purely an illusion nor entirely unfettered; rather, it exists within the constraints of evolved cognitive structures.

Ultimately, free will may not be an absolute but a spectrum of agency—one that has been shaped by the unique evolutionary trajectory of the human brain. Whether free will is fully real or partially illusory, it remains a defining characteristic of human experience, central to our moral and existential identity.

The Future of Free Will and Determinism

The debate over free will and determinism has been a longstanding philosophical and scientific discussion. While determinism posits that all events, including human actions, are determined by preceding causes, the concept of free will suggests that individuals can make genuine choices independent of deterministic constraints.

The Challenge of Determinism and Free Will

A primary challenge to free will has emerged from neuroscience, particularly the work of Benjamin Libet and subsequent experiments, which suggest that decisions may be initiated by unconscious neural processes before conscious awareness. As Mele⁴² critiques, however, these studies do not conclusively disprove free will but rather highlight the complexity of decision-making.

He argues that while neural signals may precede conscious awareness, this does not necessarily mean decisions are made without conscious input.⁴²

Similarly, Thagard⁶⁴ notes that decision-making is not merely a linear, conscious process but a parallel constraint satisfaction mechanism involving emotional and cognitive inputs. This perspective suggests that while determinism might influence decisions at the neural level, the emergent complexity of cognitive processes still allows for meaningful autonomy.⁶⁴

Balaguer⁵ presents another crucial argument against strict determinism. He states that while classical physics supports deterministic frameworks, quantum mechanics introduces fundamental indeterminacy at microscopic levels, which might influence human decision-making.

However, as he points out, the presence of indeterminism does not automatically translate into free will, as randomness does not equate to control (Free will as an Open Scientific Problem).

Frith and Frith¹³ introduce the concept of mentalizing, the ability to infer others’ mental states, which is a crucial aspect of social interaction and decision-making. If human behavior were purely deterministic, one might expect predictability in all social interactions. However, mentalizing relies on an understanding that individuals can choose between alternatives based on context, suggesting an interplay between deterministic brain processes and the flexibility of social cognition.

The Future of Free Will: Possible Resolutions

One of the most promising perspectives on the future of free will is compatibilism—the view that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive. Many contemporary philosophers argue that as long as an individual can act according to their own motivations and reasoning processes, they can be said to possess free will, even if those processes are ultimately determined.⁵

Humean compatibilism, as discussed by Balaguer⁵, defines free will as the ability to act according to one’s desires without external compulsion. This view aligns with Thagard’s (2010) neural perspective, where decision-making emerges from complex neural computations rather than simple causal determinism.

Thagard⁶⁴ argues that while free will may not exist in a traditional metaphysical sense, it can be understood in terms of brain processes that enable goal-directed behavior. He suggests that autonomy arises from an individual’s ability to generate and evaluate options, integrating emotions and rational thought into decision-making.

Moreover, Frith and Frith¹³ highlight the brain’s capacity for self-reflection and prediction, allowing for a form of self-determined decision-making that is not strictly constrained by deterministic laws.

If human decisions are shaped by past experiences but also involve real-time contextual evaluation, this suggests a nuanced form of free will rather than outright determinism.

One of the significant consequences of this debate is its impact on moral and legal responsibility. If determinism were absolute, the foundation of accountability would be undermined. However, Thagard⁶⁴ argues that holding individuals responsible for their actions remains justifiable from a consequentialist perspective—social systems rely on responsibility to deter harmful behavior and encourage ethical conduct.

Greene and Cohen²⁰ further argue that while neuroscience may challenge traditional notions of retributive justice, it supports a shift toward a rehabilitation-focused approach to justice, where understanding the neural basis of behavior can lead to better interventions rather than strict punitive measures.⁶⁴

Free Will vs. Determinism: A Comparative Analysis

Conclusion

The future of free will and determinism will likely involve an integrative approach rather than a binary resolution. The emerging scientific perspective suggests that human decision-making is neither entirely free nor completely determined.

Instead, it operates within a framework of constraints—genetic, neurological, and environmental—while still allowing for meaningful agency through complex cognitive and emotional processes.

Rather than viewing free will as a metaphysical absolute, a pragmatic approach rooted in neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy offers a more nuanced understanding. This perspective supports moral responsibility, social cohesion, and personal autonomy while acknowledging the intricate mechanisms underlying human choice.

In this sense, free will, though redefined, remains a vital and functional concept in human society.

For instance, studies in neuroscience suggest that brain activity precedes conscious decision-making, challenging the notion of true autonomy. However, many psychologists argue that the perception of free will plays a crucial role in shaping emotional well-being and moral behavior. Believing we have the power to choose fosters a sense of agency, resilience, and personal growth. On the other hand, accepting a deterministic view may encourage compassion, as it frames human actions as the result of factors beyond individual control.

This ongoing dialogue between free will and determinism not only deepens our understanding of human nature but also influences how we navigate ethical dilemmas, legal systems, and interpersonal relationships.

References

1. Ansermet, F., & Magistretti, P. (2007). Biology of freedom: Neural plasticity, experience, and the unconscious. Columbia University Press.
2. Baer, J., Kaufman, J. C., & Baumeister, R. F. (Eds.). (2008). Are we free? Psychology and free will. Oxford University Press.
3. Baumeister, R. F., Masicampo, E. J., & Vohs, K. D. (2011). Do conscious thoughts cause behavior? MIT Press.
4. Baumeister, R. F., Mele, A. R., & Vohs, K. D. (Eds.). (2010). Free will and consciousness: How might they work? Oxford University Press.
5. Balaguer, M. (2010). Free will as an open scientific problem. MIT Press.
6. Corballis, M. C. (2011). The recursive mind: The origins of human language, thought, and civilization. Princeton University Press.
7. Damasio, A. R. (1999). The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of consciousness. Harcourt Brace.
8. Dennett, D. C. (2003). Freedom evolves. Viking.
9. Doyle, B. (2016). Free will: The scandal in philosophy. I-Phi Press.
10. Eccles, J. C. (1989). Evolution of the brain: Creation of the self. Routledge.
11. Bonicalzi, S., & Haggard, P. (Eds.). (2021). From freedom from to freedom to: New perspectives on intentional action. Springer.
12. Fried, I., Haggard, P., He, B. J., & Schurger, A. (2017). Volition and action in the human brain: Processes, pathologies, and reasons. MIT Press.
13. Frith, C. D., & Frith, U. (2006). The neural basis of mentalizing. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 361(1476), 2155-2165.
14. Fuster, J. (2013). The neuroscience of freedom and creativity: Our predictive brain. Cambridge University Press.
15. Gazzaniga, M. S. (2011). Who’s in charge? Free will and the science of the brain. HarperCollins.
16. Geisler, N. L. (2001). Chosen but free: A balanced view of divine election (2nd ed.). Bethany House.
17. Glannon, W. (Ed.). (2015). Free will and the brain: Neuroscientific, philosophical, and legal perspectives. Cambridge University Press.
18. Gold, J. I., & Shadlen, M. N. (2007). The neural basis of decision making. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 30, 535-574.
19. Graziano, M. S. A. (2013). Consciousness and the social brain. Oxford University Press.
20. Greene, J., & Cohen, J. (2004). For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 359(1451), 1775-1785.
21. Griffith, M. (2013). Free will: The basics. Routledge.
22. Haggard, P. (2008). Human volition: Towards a neuroscience of will. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9(12), 934-946.
23. Harris, S. (2012). Free will. Free Press.
24. Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge
25. Frankfurt, H. (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. Journal of Philosophy.
26. Haggard, P. (2019). Human volition: Towards a neuroscience of will. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 20(2), 81-92
27. Honderich, T. (2002). How free are you? The determinism problem (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.
28. Hook, S. (Ed.). (1958). Determinism and freedom in the age of modern science. Collier Books.
29. Jackson, M. O. (2019). The human network: How your social position determines your power, beliefs, and behaviors. Pantheon.
30. Kane, R. (1998). The significance of free will. Oxford University Press.
31. Kane, R. (Ed.). (2011). The Oxford handbook of free will (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.
32. Krueger, J. I. (2025). The false belief in free will. Routledge.
33. Lavazza, A. (2016). Free will and neuroscience: From explaining freedom away to new ways of operationalizing and measuring it. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 10, 262.
34. Laureys, S. (Ed.). (2005). The boundaries of consciousness: Neurobiology and neuropathology. Elsevier.
35. Libet, B. (2004). Mind time: The temporal factor in consciousness. Harvard University Press.
36. Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain, 106(3), 623–642. https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/106.3.623
37. Locke, E. A. (2016). The illusion of determinism: Why free will is real and causal. Springer.
38. Maoz, U., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (Eds.). (2022). Free will: Philosophers and neuroscientists in conversation. Oxford University Press.
39. Matsuhashi, M., & Hallett, M. (2008). The timing of the conscious intention to move. Journal of Neuroscience, 28(28), 7015-7021.
40. McGilchrist, I. (2010). The master and his emissary: The divided brain and the making of the Western world. Yale University Press.
41. Mele, A. R. (2006). Free will and luck. Oxford University Press.
42. Mele, A. R. (2014). Free: Why science hasn’t disproved free will. Oxford University Press.
43. Mele, A. (2019). Aspects of Agency: Decisions, Abilities, Explanations, and Free will. Oxford University Press.
44. Metzinger, T. (2009). The ego tunnel: The science of the mind and the myth of the self. Basic Books.
45. Morse, S. J. (2015). Neuroscience, free will, and criminal responsibility. In J. Clausen & N. Levy (Eds.), Handbook of neuroethics (pp. 599-616). Springer.
46. Murphy, N., & Brown, W. S. (2007). Did my neurons make me do it? Philosophical and neurobiological perspectives on moral responsibility and free will. Oxford University Press.
47. Nadelhoffer, T., Murray, S., & Murray, E. (2021). Intuitions about free will and the failure to comprehend determinism. Philosophical Psychology, 34(3), 367-393.
48. Pereboom, D. (2001). Living Without Free will. Cambridge University Press.
49. Pinker, S. (1997). How the mind works. W.W. Norton & Company.
50. Prinz, J. J. (2012). The conscious brain: How attention engenders experience. Oxford University Press.
51. Roskies, A. (2006). Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(9), 419-423.
52. Sapolsky, R. M. (2023). Determined: A science of life without free will. Penguin Press.
53. Searle, J. R. (2007). Freedom and neurobiology: Reflections on free will, language, and political power. Columbia University Press.
54. Singh, P. (2016). The great illusion. Science Literacy Books.
55. Soon, C. S., Brass, M., Heinze, H. J., & Haynes, J. D. (2008). Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nature Neuroscience, 11(5), 543-545.
56. Strawson, G. (1986). Freedom and Belief. Oxford University Press.
57. Swinburne, R. (2013). Mind, brain, and free will. Oxford University Press.
58. Tse, P. U. (2013). The neural basis of free will: Criterial causation. MIT Press.
59. Van Inwagen, P. (1983). An Essay on Free will. Oxford University Press.
60. Watson, G. (Ed.). (1982). Free will. Oxford University Press.
61. Wegner, D. M. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. MIT Press.
62. Wolf, S. (1990). Freedom within reason. Oxford University Press.
63. Wu, Y., Zang, Y., Yuan, B., & Tian, X. (n.d.). Neural correlates of decision making after unfair treatment.
64. Thagard, P. (2010). The brain and the meaning of life. Princeton University Press.

Notes

[1] T: Total Depravity
U: Unconditional Election
L: Limited Atonement
I: Irresistible Grace
P: Perseverance of the Saints

[2] The sense of agency (SoA), or sense of control, is the subjective awareness of initiating, executing, and controlling one’s own volitional actions in the world.